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1. FINANCING SMEs IN EUROPE





Small and medium-sized enterprises are a centrepiece of Europe’s economy. 
Due to their limited size and their generally lower creditworthiness, their access 
to financial market instruments is more limited than for large enterprises, 
which benefit from more elaborate Treasury operations, economies of scale 
also in their financing operations and, in particular, from access to securitized 
lending and stock markets. These limitations for SMEs may seriously limit 
their expansion potential and, in particular when it comes to lack of risk 
capital, their innovation and R&D activity.
Against this background, a conference on “Financing SMEs in Europe” was 
jointly organised by SUERF and the Banque de France on 11 and 12 September 
2008 in Paris. The conference addressed three issues: First, major theories of 
SMEs’ financing behaviour were presented and evaluated. Second, the nexus 
between financing constraints and the growth and profitability of SMEs 
was investigated empirically on the basis of cross-country and a number 
of individual country case studies. Third, the special role of bank credit for 
SMEs, the consequences of Basel II on credit risk analysis and SMEs’ possible 
strategic replies were discussed. This article aims to provide an overview of 
major lines of argument and insights derived from the conference,
4 and draws 
some conclusions for the current financial crisis and economic downturn and 
for the longer-term.
1 Chairman SUERF Editorial Board and Professor of Finance Emeritus, Aarhus School of, 
University of Aarhus, Denmark, mb@asb.dk.
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4 The aim is to provide a synthetic overview of contributions deemed most relevant for the 
topic at hand, rather than following the chronological order of the conference. Papers referred to 
which are displayed in bold italics are included in this SUERF Study, with other papers being in 
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1.  Financing Behaviour of SMEs – Competing Theories
There are competing theories for how SMEs choose among various forms of 
finance. The pecking order theory claims that the cheapest source of finance is 
used first. The static trade-off theory states that marginal financing costs drive 
financing decisions, as a result additional financing is used from various sources 
in parallel. The asset side theory argues that the use of funds (i.e. a firm’s asset 
side) matters for the optimal source of finance. Bartholdy and Mateus (2008) 
use Portuguese firm data to test for the relevance of these three theories and do 
not find support for the first two theories but some support for the third theory. 
Further research will be required to clarify this interesting question.
2.  Financing Obstacles and Firm Growth
– Some Comparative Country Evidence
A number of cross country study studies and country case studies presented 
at the conference show that SMEs indeed face considerable financing 
constraints, which hamper both their profit and turnover growth. The starting 
point for the analysis is that asymmetric information between the lender and 
the borrower of firms may hamper lenders’ readiness to provide finance. 
This in turn would hamper the borrowers’ growth performance. Coluzzi et 
al., (2008), use survey information collected from firms by the World Bank 
to capture an indicator of financing constraints for five euro area countries 
(Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Portugal). They find that young and/or 
small firms in principle grow faster than larger and older firms. At the same 
time, they also face considerably more severe financing restrictions than 
other firms. Also, firms of the manufacturing and construction sectors are 
more likely to feel financing constraints, which may be attributable to the 
high capital intensity of these sectors. As could be expected, increased sales
– which reflect better success of the chosen business model – lessen financing 
constraints. Regarding the impact of financing constraints on growth, the 9 Financing Obstacles and Firm Growth – Some Comparative Country Evidence
authors find that more cash flow fosters growth. The probability of financial 
obstacles (proxied by age, size and other firm features) is found to affect 
growth for all countries except for Germany. The effect of higher leverage 
is ambiguous: it fosters growth in some countries (Spain, France and Italy) 
while it hampers growth in Germany and Portugal.
This latter aspect of the effect of financing leverage on firms’ behaviour is 
further investigated in Huyghebaert (2008). The author argues that higher 
leverage creates incentives for an entrepreneur to maximize short-term 
earnings in order to reduce the risk of adverse credit decisions by lenders and 
a possibly resulting liquidation of the firm, since firm survival is a crucial 
consideration for entrepreneurs who typically hold a largely undiversified 
investment portfolio and enjoy sizeable private benefits from control. The 
positive effect of higher leverage on profitability is empirically confirmed 
for start-up firms in Belgium. This positive effect of leverage is also found to 
persist, albeit growing at a declining rate, as firms age.
Savignac and Sevestre (2008), investigate empirically for a sample of French 
firms whether small firms and innovative firms are financially constrained. 
Their study confirms that such firms indeed face a higher interest rate spread 
than other firms, which reduces their loan demand. Being innovative has 
a larger negative impact on loan demand for SMEs than for large firms. As 
expected, the availability of tangible assets which can be used as collateral 
facilitates SMEs’ access to bank credit. By contrast, an existing high debt 
ratio acts as an obstacle to further credit.
These academic findings were contrasted with a practitioner’s view, based 
on a survey among Dutch firms (von Dewall, (2007)). Broadly speaking, the 
study concluded that external financing constraints are not experienced by 
conservative, self-constrained firms, while truly expansionary entrepreneurs 
– which are the minority in the Netherlands – are likely to face financing 
constraints. While particularly for this minority of strongly expansionary 
firms lack of risk capital and the absence of well-functioning venture capital 
markets hamper growth, the bigger problem according to this author seems 
to be a lack of skills at various levels: entrepreneurial skills at the level of the 
firm, lack of skills of accountants, and lack of skills at banks in the context 
of their lending and financing decisions. Banks’ moving towards automated 
expert credit information and evaluation systems might further exacerbate this 
problem, reinforcing the notion that banks are not the best suited institutions 
to provide risk capital.10 Financing Obstacles and Firm Growth – Some Comparative Country Evidence
Credit constraints may, among other factors, also contribute to a small 
firm’s motivation to join a larger group. Using a large data set of French 
firms, Kremp and Phillippon (2008), identify a major shift in the structure 
of ownership of SMEs over the past decade. In 2006, more than half of 
French SMEs belonged to a group (i.e. at least half of their capital belonged 
to another firm), against 80% in 1997. Over the same period, the number of 
holding companies tripled. Holding companies now account for one third 
of non-financial enterprises’ outstanding bank debt. Membership in a group 
can strongly affect a firm’s financing behaviour, e.g. in the sense that the 
holding company borrows from banks for the group as a whole, while the 
group’s member firms turn to the holding company for financing. The strong 
drive towards membership in firm groups is rooted in several motivations: 
Group membership alleviates credit constraints faced by individual small 
firms, facilitates access to foreign markets, or can also be the chosen exit 
strategy in the event of retirement of the current owner or manager. Joining 
a group is shown to improve SMEs’ growth and survival rates, more so even 
if they join a foreign group.
Optimal growth conditions for enterprises are particularly important in 
developing countries. It is all the more worrisome that a cross-country 
study on firms’ financing conditions in transition economies (Volz (2008)) 
finds that firms in transition economies continue to be seriously financially 
constrained – a large fraction of firms in these countries still have no bank 
loans, particularly small firms continue to have problems of access to 
financing. The – forced – strong dominance of internal financing for small 
firms hampers firm development. Surprisingly, banking system reform may 
even have worsened access to finance for SMEs. In principle, the entry 
and operations of foreign banks should bring a transfer of know how and 
increase the efficiency of a transition economies’ financial sectors. However, 
in practice foreign bank activity seems to benefit primarily larger firms, with 
smaller firms being more or less left out. Furthermore, higher concentration 
in the banking sector is found to improve financing conditions for SMEs. This 
is in line with the monopolistic-creditor hypothesis (see Petersen and Rajan 
(1995)), which states that a quasi-monopolistic situation in banking could 
help banks to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with firms.11
3.  Bank Credit, Credit Risk Analysis under Basel II,
and SMEs’ Financing Strategies
Due to SMEs’ limited access to securitized forms of financing, banks play 
a crucial role for SMEs’ external financing. Bank credit restrictions therefore 
affect SMEs more severely than large firms. In this context, the conference 
addressed several interesting aspects in this context: First, do bank loans and 
trade credits affect SMEs’ investment behaviour differently? Second, what 
effects for credit supply can be expected from rating rules under Basel II, and 
how can SMEs adjust to this new framework? Third, to what extent can risk 
diversification effects be expected to come into play in banks’ SME credit 
portfolios? Fourth, if banks’ internal credit rating systems differ, might this 
result in different credit ratings for one and the same SME, and might this 
in turn prompt “credit rating arbitrage” on the part of SMEs? Fifth, what are 
the mutual relationships between macroeconomic developments and firms’ 
financial fragility? And finally, to what extent can “group borrowing”, e.g. in 
the form of mutual guarantee schemes, help SMEs to secure more favourable 
credit ratings?
Regarding the first aspect, Carbó–Valverde et al. (2008), investigate 
the question as to whether the empirically observed correlation between 
investment and cash flow is a good indicator of financing constraints for 
a large sample of Spanish SMEs. Contrary to the established literature, they 
use an alternative approach, considering recourse to bank loans versus trade 
credit. They find that investment is sensitive to bank loans for financially 
unconstrained firms, while trade credit predicts investment for constrained 
firms. By granting trade credit to other firms, unconstrained firms act as 
“financial intermediaries”.
Relating to the second question, a much-discussed issue is whether, and if so 
how, the new Basel II Capital Accord and the Capital Requirements Directive 
could affect access to, and the cost of, credit for SMEs. Although SME 
funding by banks which use either the standardized or internal ratings-based 
approach are subject to a lower capital requirement than loans to large firms, 
the Basel II Accord still implies that more risky loans face higher capital 
charges. To the extent that SMEs are more risky, they may face higher credit 
costs than larger firms. 12 Bank Credit, Credit Risk Analysis under Basel II, and SMEs’...
Starting from an overview of SME financing and the main constraints to SME 
financing by banks, Ayadi (2008) evaluates the likely impact of the Capital 
Requirements Directive and Basel II on SME financing in Europe. Basel II 
will increase banks’ administrative costs to originate and manage the credit 
portfolio according to the more sophisticated rules; it will increase the cost 
of the banks’ own resources; and it may possibly entail higher risk premiums 
to the extent that SMEs represent above-average risks. In an economic 
downturn, Basel II may accentuate pro-cyclical bank lending behaviour.
Ayadi proposes a broad range of measures to improve SME financing under 
the new rating culture: First, banks should improve transparency on their 
internal ratings (with the optimal degree of such transparency being discussed 
quite intensively at the conference), give reasons for down or upgrades and 
credit decisions and provide financial advice. SMEs should strive to better 
understand banks’ loan requirements, deliver clear, complete and timely 
financial and performance data, and improve rating-relevant factors (such as 
cash flow, equity, accounting, controlling, management, the business strategy, 
collateral and guarantees. Public policy should promote a code of conduct for 
minimum ratings disclosure, foster venture capital, and improve tax treatment 
of retained earnings.
Regarding the third topic, Dietsch and Petey (2008), investigate a specific 
issue relating to capital requirements for banks’ SME loan portfolios, namely 
the diversification potential within large portfolios of SMEs. Extending the 
standard one-factor credit default model to multiple factors, which takes into 
account size, sector and location, they compute economic capital allocations 
for large portfolios of French SME loans. They find that two opposing effects 
are at play when estimating aggregate credit risk for an SME loan portfolio: 
on the one hand, diversification decreases economic capital; on the other hand, 
a more complete representation of default rate dynamics in such a framework 
increases economic capital. As to be expected, portfolio risk diversification 
in large SME loan portfolios depends on the heterogeneity of the firms in 
the portfolio, in particular in terms of cyclicality or industry, and size. They 
conclude, first, that the standard one-factor model and its applications do not 
properly take into account potential diversification effects in an SME loan 
portfolio. Second, however, a model that takes into account diversification 
effects might still generate higher required capital levels, because it captures 
credit risk better.13 Bank Credit, Credit Risk Analysis under Basel II, and SMEs’...
Regarding the fourth question, Bernet and Westerfeld (2008), start from 
the fact that internal rating models used by banks to evaluate SMEs’ 
creditworthiness differ substantially with regard to the underlying rating 
philosophy, the rating system architecture and rating model calibration. They 
test for a representative sample of Swiss SMEs whether different rating 
models lead to different risk classifications, even though identical input data 
are used. Their finding that different rating models indeed yield different 
rating results opens the possibility of “rating arbitrage” by creditors between 
various banks. The authors also investigate whether inclusion of qualitative 
information leads to more favourable ratings, compared to ratings based 
solely on quantitative data; contrary to other research, their empirical findings 
do not confirm this notion.
The fifth issue of how macroeconomic fluctuations affect firms’ financial 
fragility was also taken up by Bruneau et al. (2008). Using stress tests, 
they confirm that macroeconomic conditions affect firms’ financial fragility. 
Conversely, they also show that microeconomic data on financial fragility 
can be useful as a leading indicator for business cycle developments at the 
macro level.
As regards the final issue, one way to overcome informational asymmetries 
and banks’ caution in granting credit to risky SMEs is to “outsource” some 
of banks’ financing functions. An interesting case study in this respect 
concerns Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGIs), a form of group lending, 
in which banks, instead of lending to a single borrower, lend to a group of 
borrowers which are jointly responsible for honouring the liability. MGIs are 
quite widespread, particularly in Germany, France, Spain, and, above all, in 
Italy: According to the European Mutual Guarantee Association, currently 
there are more than 1.4 million SMEs affiliated to an MGI. Columba et al. 
(2008), show that such schemes are indeed able to reduce SMEs’ financing 
costs. The main rationale for this alternative contractual relationship to 
effectively mitigate information asymmetries is that each member of the 
Mutual Guarantee group is better informed of the other associated firms than 
a bank would be, given that group members are mostly part of the same local 
community. Thus, MGIs perform useful screening and monitoring functions 
among associated firms. MGIs may under certain conditions also reduce 
regulatory capital requirements for banks granting credit to them. Finally, 
MGIs pool several small firms’ credit needs and increase those creditors’ 
negotiation power vis-à-vis creditor banks.14
4.  Some Conclusions for the Current Financial Crisis
and for the Longer Term
The conference has shown that the factors driving SME financing decisions 
are complex, as reflected inter alia by an ambiguous theoretical and empirical 
literature. However, it seems safe to conclude that there is a substantial fraction 
– maybe one third – of financially constrained SMEs. These constraints indeed 
seem to hamper investment and innovation, and thus growth, employment and 
welfare. In addition, lack of skills at various levels (entrepreneurs, banks, firm 
owners…) may also be important. Various measures to improve the situation 
are feasible and realistic and should be targeted at the SMEs themselves, 
financial intermediaries, and at public policy in general.
Debt financing continues to be the primary source of financing for SMEs 
in Europe, much more important than venture capital. This implies, for one 
thing, that an efficient functioning of credit markets is of utmost importance 
for SMEs – and the economy at large – to thrive. This problem seems to be 
particularly severe in transition economies, whose catching-up may suffer 
from continued wide-spread exclusion of SMEs from external bank finance. 
The continued small role of venture capital financing brings back to mind the 
lack of developed venture capital markets in most European countries. The 
latter seem particularly important for the most innovative and expansionary 
firms. Europe foregoes growth potential by not solving this issue. But a more 
prominent role of venture capital – and more generally risk capital – in 
SME financing could also act as a welcome buffer for cyclical fluctuations. 
A higher share of equity financing (e.g. through venture capital) would be 
expected to make firms’ balance sheets more robust to (severe) economic 
fluctuations. Maybe, the current crisis will trigger renewed efforts to develop 
this hitherto rather neglected form of financing.
The studies presented at the conference show that in the majority of European 
countries, bigger financial leverage of SMEs is associated with higher 
profit and sales growth. Debt may thus serve as an incentive to perform 
well, particularly for young start-up firms. Higher leverage may also reflect 
a firm’s quality in the sense that more talented entrepreneurs are willing and 
able to obtain more credit.15 Some Conclusions for the Current Financial Crisis...
At the same time, higher leverage also entails higher risk, be it due to rapidly 
deteriorating economic conditions, be it due to a rapid rise in risk premiums 
on loans and possible quantitative credit constraints. The increased risk-
sensitivity of the Basel II framework may accentuate the tightening of SMEs’ 
financing conditions in an economic downturn. Deteriorating payments 
behaviour in a downturn may also undermine SME’s commercial transactions, 
casting additional doubt on SMEs’ creditworthiness and leading to a further 
curbing in lending would thus probably be particularly serious for SMEs. The 
Basel II framework may induce or increase the pro-cyclical effects of banks’ 
lending behaviour (see Ayadi (2008)), particularly so in times of financial 
system dysfunctioning.
The threat of a “credit crunch” in bank lending would thus likely hit SMEs 
particularly hard. (while, at the same time, the recently observed drying up 
of securitized lending and stock market issuing affect larger enterprises more 
strongly). To limit real economic consequences for SMEs’ continued smooth 
operation, government and central bank measures to maintain or, where 
necessary, re-establish banks’ ability and/or willingness to lend are crucial. 
As has been shown by co-ordinated measures of European Governments 
and central banks, the authorities are fully aware of this and are ready to act 
accordingly.
As always, while the conference shed light of many important issues, others 
remained to be answered. For instance, it could not be convincingly clarified 
whether easy access to credit supports profits/growth or whether the causality 
may (also) run in the opposite direction. What are the true reasons underlying 
financial constraints? Are the constraints, which are for instance quoted in 
firm surveys, real or just perceived? What should be the role of public policy 
given positive externalities of radical innovation for the economy at large? 
It will be for future conferences and research projects to address these and 
other issues.
What the conference could definitely achieve is to contribute, through many 
cross country and case studies, to benchmarking and mutual learning across 
countries and across SUERF’s three constituencies, central banks (and public 
authorities at large), financial intermediaries (and the private sector at large), 
and academic researchers.16
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Abstract:
In this paper, we consider what determines the capital structure of business 
start-ups. Empirical research shows that when information and incentive 
problems are potentially large, banks limit their fraction of total financing. 
Conversely, banks are willing to invest more in firms with promising growth 
prospects. Besides, entrepreneurs who highly value private benefits of control 
structure their financing so as to reduce the likelihood of premature liquidation. 
Thereafter, we look at the implications of financing decisions for firm 
performance, growth and survival. Empirical research here reveals that business 
start-ups with higher leverage are not only more profitable, but also report 
higher growth in earnings over time. Yet, leverage also makes firms vulnerable 
to financial market predation, which reduces their survival chances.20
1. Introduction
When examining the role of finance in entrepreneurial business start-ups, 
it is important to keep in mind the following firm characteristics. First, 
information asymmetries between firm-insiders, i.e. the entrepreneur, and 
outside financiers are large, as no historical information is available on newly 
established ventures. These firms just lack a prior financial and operating 
history. Also, business start-ups are subject to less stringent rules regarding 
information disclosure than are large listed firms. Moreover, start-up firms 
do not have a reputation at stake that can reduce asymmetric information 
and moral hazard concerns in the spirit of Diamond (1991). Second, the 
failure rates of business start-ups are known to be huge. The literature has 
documented repeatedly that about 50% of new entrepreneurial ventures 
disappear within the first five years after their establishment (e.g., Berger 
and Udell, (1998); Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, (2004)). Hence, the 
issues of adverse selection before a financial contract is written and ex-post 
risk-shifting incentives cannot be ignored. Third, ownership is typically 
highly concentrated in the hands of the entrepreneur and perhaps also some 
friends and members of the family, who are willing to assume and share risk. 
Although the latter informal financing channels are even more important in 
developing countries, their role in more developed economies in Europe and 
even the USA is not trivial either. Because of this ownership structure, without 
separation of ownership and managerial control, agency problems of equity 
are negligible, whereas private benefits of control can be quite substantial. 
In the context of entrepreneurial firms, private benefits of control include 
the prestige and status that comes with ownership, the power to decide on 
the business strategy of the firm, and independence from superiors (see 
Huyghebaert et al. (2007)). These private benefits of control can explain the 
reluctance of entrepreneurs to raise equity from outsiders. Also, because of 
control rents, entrepreneurs sometimes are willing to stay in self-employment, 
despite their lower income, whereas they may be unwilling to liquidate their 
venture when outside financiers consider this to be the most efficient solution. 
Private benefits of control tend to reinforce risk-shifting incentives once the 
firm is heading for financial distress.
In this paper, we elaborate on the implications of the above firm characteristics 
for the financing decisions of business start-ups. So, in the first part of this 
article, we consider what determines the capital structure of business start-ups. 
We look at the generalizability of research outcomes in this stream of the 21 Introduction
literature to the more general context of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and point out some avenues for future research. In the second part 
of the paper, we discuss the implications of financing decisions for firm 
performance, growth and survival, from which we draw some conclusions 
for public policy.
2. Financing  decisions
When considering the sources of financing that are available for entrepreneurial 
business start-ups, it seems that traditional newly established firms usually do 
not rely upon venture capital (e.g., Ooghe et al. (1991); Berger and Udell 
(1998)). In general, external financing sources are limited to bank loans and 
trade credit in the first few years after start-up. Berger and Udell (1998), 
among others, already pointed this out when stressing the importance of the 
‘life cycle paradigm’ for SME financing decisions. For US firms, Berger and 
Udell claim that the sources from the principal owner, bank loans and trade 
credit account for 70% to 80% of total financing for SMEs, independent of firm 
size and age. For Belgian business start-ups, Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht 
(2007) demonstrate the huge reliance of these firms on debt financing. The 
median company raises 82% of its total sources by means of external debt 
(in their definitions, debt never includes the loans the entrepreneur extends to 
her own company). About half of this debt – 45% to be exact – is contracted 
from banks, whereas trade credit accounts for about 25% of total debt. The 
other debt largely consists of liabilities vis-à-vis the workforce, tax authorities 
and prepayments from customers. Leasing is only marginally important for 
the enterprises in their sample (4%). Besides, the debt that is being raised in 
the start-up year has to be repaid on short notice. The maturity structure of 
borrowings indeed reveals that most debt has a maturity less than one year. 
However, when focusing solely on the outstanding bank loans, only 20% of 
outstanding bank debt has to be repaid within the coming year.
Within this sample of business start-ups, Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht 
(2007) use a simultaneous equations model to examine the joint determinants 
of leverage, the fraction of debt that consists of bank loans, and the maturity 
structure of these bank loans. Although the literature has argued repeatedly 
that banks, through their screening and monitoring of borrowers, have an 22 Financing decisions
advantage in financing informationally opaque firms, the empirical results in 
the study of Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2007) reveal that when adverse 
selection problems are potentially large, banks actually finance a smaller 
fraction of total debt, ceteris paribus. The same applies to incentive problems 
between borrowers and lenders. When risk-shifting incentives are potentially 
large, banks actually finance a smaller fraction of total debt, all else constant. 
Adverse selection and risk-shifting problems do not affect the maturity 
structure of these bank loans, however. Interestingly, when start-up firms rely 
less on bank loans for their financing, they turn to leasing companies and – 
especially when leasing is not easily accessible – to trade credit. Arguably, 
these results thus suggest that lessors and suppliers use other mechanisms than 
banks to reduce information and incentive problems. Nonetheless, business 
start-ups are not able to fully compensate their more difficult access to bank 
debt by relying more on these alternative financing sources.
Overall, the empirical findings in the article of Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht 
(2007) point out that when information and incentive problems are potentially 
large, banks do not finance a larger proportion of total debt. These results thus 
conflict with the theoretical framework in the corporate finance literature up 
till now, where it has been argued that by specializing in the assessment and 
monitoring of borrowers, banks can overcome the problems of duplication 
of efforts and free-riding among lenders (Diamond (1994)). However, the 
results also reveal that banks do not decide to stay out of these enterprises all 
together, but simply finance a smaller fraction of total debt, possibly to reduce 
their exposure to potential losses upfront. Simultaneously, by providing at 
least part of total financing, banks can secure that a long-term relationship that 
may pay off in the future can be built up with these firms. Given their lower 
involvement in the financing of risky business start-ups, banks no longer feel 
a need to reduce their exposure to information and incentive problems by 
shortening the maturity of their loans, which allows terminating the contract 
when bad information is obtained and/or expropriation is detected. In sum, 
these results suggest that banks are not largely involved in the screening of 
borrowing candidates. In a follow-up study, Huyghebaert et al. (2008 mimeo), 
who analyze the earnings management incentives of business start-ups, find 
that newly established ventures in need of a first bank loan manage their 
earnings upwards by means of trade accruals and non-cash working capital 
accruals. However, this earnings management does not affect the lending 
decisions of banks either, not in a positive manner when entrepreneurs are 
able to positively influence bank lending decisions, but also not in a negative 
manner when banks penalize companies for the information risk resulting 
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screening by banks in the start-up context. We are aware, however, that these 
results may be difficult to generalize to other SMEs. Nonetheless, the above 
findings raise questions about how relationships between banks and firms are 
actually developed. Indeed, our knowledge of how firms acquire a reputation 
in the bank loan market is only limited. What type of information do banks 
actually collect? How frequently do they do this? Etc. These are questions 
we are far more familiar with when considering venture capital contracts 
as opposed to bank loans. Up till now, researchers typically have used the 
‘length of the lending relationship’ as a proxy for private information that 
was collected by the bank over time, but this measure seems to be a black 
box, especially in the context of business start-ups and even in the broader 
context of SMEs. Hence, more research seems needed to further explore what 
banking relationships mean and imply for these firms. Thereby, one may have 
to take into account that when firms are very small and when screening and 
monitoring is complex, the latter activities may be cost ineffective from the 
point of view of banks (see also Ravid and Spiegel (1997)).
Besides, Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2007) document that banks are 
willing to lend to business start-ups with promising growth prospects, 
although these firms have a lower total debt ratio. These results again support 
the notion that banks may be interested in building up relationships especially 
with companies where the payoffs from such relationships tend to be higher. 
Once business start-ups in industries with a high-growth profile reach the 
growth stage, banks indeed may be able to reap the full benefits of having 
invested in a long-term relationship. Some authors have argued that banks 
earn rents from investing in relationships with their debtors. Consider the 
study of Degryse and Ongena (2005), who point out that banks charge higher 
loan rates to borrowers that are located closest to their bank branch. From 
these results, Degryse and Ongena infer that local banks are able to earn 
location rents from developing relationships with clients in close proximity. 
Here too, we do not know yet much about such inter-temporal substitution 
effects. While Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that the development of 
a banking relationship positively affects the availability of bank loans, they 
also conclude that the length of the relationship virtually has no impact on 
the price of this financing. Some authors have pointed out that collateral 
requirements decrease over the course of a lending relationship, while other 
studies have shown that the price of bank loans actually increases as firms 
develop a relationship with their bank (e.g., Degryse and Van Cayseele 
(2000)). So, there is room for a further examination of these dynamics in 
lending and borrowing decisions. More importantly, we believe that these 
research questions can best be answered in the context of SMEs, including 24 Financing decisions
business start-ups, which have little alternative financing options than bank 
loans. Detecting such behavior in the context of large, listed firms may 
indeed be very difficult, because these firms may not accept bank hold-up 
behavior and turn to public debt and public equity markets. This is not to say 
that SMEs are defenseless against bank hold-up behavior. They indeed can 
develop multiple banking relationships, but this is again a topic we are not 
very familiar with. As an example, how do firms decide on the mix of loans 
raised from multiple banks? What is the minimum stake banks have to assume 
in order to perform screening and monitoring activities? Etc.
In addition to these supply-driven determinants, Huyghebaert and Van 
de Gucht (2007) demonstrate that the demand side has a huge impact on 
capital structure, too. Entrepreneurs who highly value private benefits of 
control structure their financing so as to reduce the likelihood of premature 
liquidation. More specifically, they rely less on bank debt and short-term bank 
loans in particular. These results are consistent with the idea that banks follow 
stricter liquidation rules than suppliers, as has been pointed out by Wilner 
(2001), Franks and Sussman (2005), and Huyghebaert et al. (2007), among 
others. Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2007) even find some evidence that 
entrepreneurs who highly value private benefits of control limit their overall 
debt ratio. In this area, further research could investigate how entrepreneurs 
who operate in a team make corporate finance decisions, as the meaning of 
‘private benefits of control’ is likely to be different in such a context.
Future research could also focus on how financing decisions evolve over 
time, as firms grow older (see also Huyghebaert (2006)). We indeed expect 
the influence of firm age on capital structure to be more fundamental than 
the impact of firm size. Overall, little research has examined capital structure 
in the more general context of small and medium-sized enterprises, mostly 
because of the difficulty to obtain data on these firms. Nonetheless, this 
limited research on the capital structure of SMEs shows that the results 
that apply to large listed firms also largely arise in samples of SMEs. In 
a recent study, Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) find that asset structure, firm 
size, profitability and growth affect the debt to assets ratio in a comparable 
way for SMEs in Greece and France during 1998–2002. Likewise, Sogorb-
Mira (2005) concludes that the debt ratio is negatively affected by non-debt 
tax shields and profitability, while positively influenced by firm size, asset 
structure, and growth opportunities in the context of Spanish SMEs during 
1994–1998. When examining the maturity structure of bank loans, Berger et 
al. (2005) find that asymmetric information and risk affect bank debt maturity 
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firms. So, these variables negatively affect the maturity structure of bank 
loans, and this in contrast to the results for business start-ups (Huyghebaert 
and Van de Gucht (2007)).
Given the above results and discussion, we argue that it is more appropriate 
to distinguish firms based upon differences in firm age rather than to classify 
firms based upon their size. Further support for this conjecture is obtained 
when looking again at the summary statistics in the study of Berger and Udell 
(1998), but for US data. Firm size is shown not to have much impact on firm 
financing decisions. The most significant change that takes place as firm size 
increases, is that the principal owner reduces his/her stake in the firm, thereby 
suggesting that he or she aims for portfolio diversification. As a result, the 
debt ratio increases, but the main debt sources (i.e. loans from commercial 
banks and trade credit) grow by a similar percentage and thus remain equally 
important. The impact of firm age on capital structure is documented to be 
more significant, however. In the first stage, from infant to adolescent, firms 
substantially increase their borrowings from banks, while trade credit is not 
largely affected. As firms reach the middle-aged stage and the old stage, these 
bank loans are being repaid, thereby reducing the debt ratio again. At the same 
time, the stake of the principal owner increases, probably because of retained 
earnings. So, firms obtain access to internal sources of financing as they grow 
older, which allows reducing their reliance on bank loans, consistent with the 
pecking order theory of capital structure.
When looking at the above issues in a wider European context, Wagenvoort 
(2003) already pointed out that these same conclusions regarding the 
impact of firm size apply to most European countries, that is firm size does 
not significantly affect corporate finance decisions. However, the study 
of Wagenvoort also reveals a few exceptions to this general finding. For 
Austria, Germany and Sweden, Wagenvoort shows that the use of financial 
debt reduces substantially with firm size. Overall, we do not know what is 
driving these differences in results across European countries. Although some 
researchers have documented that the determinants of capital structure are 
comparable around the world (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995); Booth et 
al. (2001)), we conclude from the above results that more research is needed 
on cross-country differences in the determinants of financing choices. More 
specifically, we believe that it is worthwhile to investigate in more detail the 
impact of differences in institutions and financial market development across 
countries on corporate finance decisions. Thereby, researchers also have 
to better explore the specificities of SMEs, in particular their asymmetric 
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owner’s desire to maintain control. Giannetti (2003) has an interesting 
paper on this topic for Europe, but she concentrates on firms included in the 
Amadeus database. So, most firms that are examined by Gianneti (2003) 
exceed the size criteria for SMEs, as their number of employees is larger than 
250. Finally, a recent study by Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006) points out 
that cross-country research casts doubt on a causal link between SMEs and 
economic development, while the authors stress the role of institutional and 
financial development. Yet, we believe that SMEs simply may not be able to 
contribute to economic growth when they face difficulties in accessing the 
formal sources of external finance. So, this argument points out once more 
that it is necessary to also investigate more extensively the relation between 
the quality of institutions and the capital structure of SMEs.
3.  Implications of financing decisions for firm 
performance, growth and survival
In a recent article, Franck and Huyghebaert (2008 mimeo) examine whether 
having a lot of debt outstanding improves or hampers firm performance in 
the first few years after start-up. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
financing decisions should not affect product market outcomes, as long 
as financial and product markets are perfect. So, Franck and Huyghebaert 
(2008) argue that leverage can affect firm performance only when some 
market imperfections pertain. When outside financiers do not have the same 
information about firm quality as do firm insiders and when it is difficult 
for insiders to credibly transfer this information to outsiders, an important 
financial market imperfection arises. Regarding product market imperfections, 
firms may recognize the impact of their decisions and behavior on one 
another when the number of competitors in a market is limited. Rival firms 
may then engage in predation to drive entrants out of their market, provided 
that the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs (see also Huyghebaert and 
Van de Gucht (2004)).
Franck and Huyghebaert (2008) focus on the above two market imperfections 
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affect the relation between leverage and post-entry performance in the context 
of business start-ups. Also, they examine how this relation changes over time, 
as the entrepreneurial venture grows older. For this purpose, they focus on 
two complementary measures of firm performance: current profitability and 
growth in earnings over time. As a number of authors have already shown 
that profitability is an important determinant of firm growth, through the 
use of retained earnings (see, for example, Watson, (2006)), examining the 
link between leverage and internal cash generation in the context of business 
start-ups can make a further contribution to the literature. Other studies on 
SMEs have shown that small and medium-sized enterprises are financially 
constrained and face a financing gap. Cash-flow investment sensitivities 
are typically large for SMEs and particularly for the smallest and unquoted 
among them. These studies thus stress once more the importance of internally 
generated earnings for firm growth and survival.
From a start-up’s perspective, firm survival is indeed a key consideration for 
entrepreneurs, as they usually hold a largely undiversified portfolio, have 
pledged personal assets to secure their firm’s bank debt, and enjoy sizeable 
private benefits of control. So, entrepreneurs may take into account that, given 
asymmetric information, weak firm performance in one year could reduce 
their firm’s access to future financing from banks and could even lead to firm 
liquidation following default. As a result, entrepreneurs may have incentives 
to boost short-term profitability, especially in the first few years after start-up, 
when information asymmetries are large. These incentives are likely to rise 
with the firm’s debt ratio, as the probability of default tends to increase with 
leverage because of higher interest payments and capital installments. As 
banks are fierce liquidators following default (e.g., Wilner (2001); Franks 
and Sussman (2005); Huyghebaert et al.  (2007)), firm survival could be 
jeopardized. So, entrepreneurs in high-debt ventures may focus especially on 
projects that generate high immediate earnings in order to meet their large 
debt-payment obligations. These entrepreneurs could even initiate projects 
that raise short-term profits to the detriment of projects with smaller initial 
earnings, but a larger net present value. Hence, more highly indebted business 
start-ups could be largely incentivized to boost their short-term EBITDA, 
ceteris paribus. For a given level of profitability, leverage-induced efforts 
to increase firm performance may also result in a higher EBITDA growth 
rate when firms have more debt outstanding. However, as newly established 
ventures grow older, information asymmetries decrease and firms typically 
start to generate more (stable) earnings. So, the pressure arising from debt 
markets to focus on immediate profits could decline. As an example, firms 
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rather than concentrate on projects that boost immediate profitability. In 
contrast to these arguments, when a large financial pressure just induces 
more highly leveraged business start-ups to maximize their current and future 
profitability, leverage could also have more long-lasting positive effects for 
firm performance.
The incentives of rival firms can also affect the leverage-performance relation 
when information asymmetries between a start-up firm and its lender(s) are 
large and when the start-up is highly dependent on the financing decisions 
of its bank. In industrial organization and corporate finance papers on this 
topic, a lot of attention has gone to the signal-jamming predation hypothesis, 
arguing that industry rivals may have incentives to distort the quality signals 
of firms to their financiers, for example through initiating a price war, if the 
expected payoff from such predatory behavior is positive for the predator. 
The predation literature has already pointed out that the payoff from 
predation is more likely to be positive when the prey is heavily indebted 
(e.g., Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004)). As the likelihood of strategic 
interactions is larger when product markets are more highly concentrated, 
Franck and Huyghebaert (2008) examine whether the above positive relation 
between leverage on the one hand and profitability and growth in earnings on 
the other hand weakens with industry concentration. The reason is that the 
gains from strategic interactions are to be shared among fewer competitors in 
a highly concentrated industry. Also, as a first extension to Huyghebaert and 
Van de Gucht (2004), Franck and Huyghebaert (2008) investigate whether the 
effects of industry concentration differ across low and high-debt industries. 
Prior empirical research has documented that strategic interactions are 
especially important in industries where incumbent firms have relatively low 
debt ratios. Besides, when industry rivals themselves are highly leveraged, 
predatory actions, such as price wars, are more difficult to sustain over a long 
period. Finally, Franck and Huyghebaert (2008) analyze whether the effects 
of industry concentration on the leverage-performance relation become 
smaller as start-ups grow older, given that a longer operating and financial 
history reduces the information value of performance indicators in one 
particular year and given that the start-up becomes less dependent on external 
financiers over time. Then, industry rivals may cut back on their predatory 
activities. This research design again extends the study of Huyghebaert and 
Van de Gucht (2004).
To examine the effects of leverage on firm performance throughout the start-
up years, Franck and Huyghebaert (2008) collect data on a unique and large 
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1996 and 2003. These firms are followed during a five-year period following 
start-up and before December 2005. 17.29% of the start-up firms in the 
sample have left the sample by the age of six. Summary statistics highlight 
that surviving firms have significantly less debt outstanding than failing 
firms. Yet, the average ratio of total debt to total assets is still very high at 
87.68% in the subsample of surviving firms, with a median value of 81.10%. 
Next, on average 36.90% of the assets of surviving firms are financed by 
means of bank debt, with the bulk contracted for a period longer than one 
year. Interestingly, although failing firms have significantly higher debt ratios 
than surviving firms, banks actually finance a significantly smaller fraction 
of total assets in failing firms. The other debt again largely consists of trade 
credit. Survivors have significantly more fixed tangible assets, whereas their 
capital expenditures are significantly larger, too. Not surprisingly, surviving 
firms significantly out-perform failing firms, both in terms of profitability and 
in terms of growth in earnings over time. The average ratio of EBITDA to 
total assets equals 18.85% for surviving firms and –9.72% for failing firms. 
Also, EBITDA on average grows by 18.05% per year for surviving firms and 
by 2.76% per year for failing firms.
Franck and Huyghebaert (2008) use a firm fixed-effects panel data specification 
to examine the relation between leverage and post-entry performance. Model 
(1) is used to test the financial pressure hypothesis, whereas Model (2) is used 
to test the predation hypothesis: 
(1)
 (2)
The test variable, Leverage, is calculated as the ratio of long-term bank loans 
to total assets and is lagged during one year. This definition takes into account 
that 1) bank loans and trade credit are the sources of external funds upon 
which most business start-ups rely and 2) trade credit usually is short-term 
financing and largely fixed at the industry level. As a result, start-ups typically 
depend upon bank loans for their long-term financing of assets, operations and 
growth. To account for the fact that a firm’s historical performance could have 
influenced its current debt ratio, i.e. a potential endogeneity problem, firm 
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tangible assets to total assets. This instrumental variable approach builds on the 
empirical work of Campello (2006), who argues that the liquidation value of 
firm assets is a good instrument for leverage. The reason is that asset tangibility 
is unrelated to firm performance. Yet, when banks incorporate the liquidation 
value of firm assets into their lending decisions, asset tangibility will greatly 
affect the firm’s debt ratio. Firm age is included as a control variable, given 
that firm performance is likely to vary with age. Franck and Huyghebaert 
(2008) further use the log of total assets and the lagged value of capital 
expenditures relative to fixed tangible assets as control variables. Besides, they 
include the sales-based Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, measured 
in the corresponding five-digit NACE industry. Finally, when considering the 
EBITDA growth rate as the dependent variable, the lagged value of the ratio of 
EBITDA to total assets is included as another control variable.
The models are estimated using Estimated Generalized Least Squares, to 
make adjustments for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity so that the 
error terms in the model are IID. In addition to estimating the above models 
in absolute terms, Franck and Huyghebaert (2008) also run the models in 
relative-to-rival terms. The reason is that industry characteristics, such as entry 
barriers, economies of scale, or market structure, can affect leverage as well 
as post-entry performance, for instance through the impact of competition. 
To implement these relative-to-rival regressions, the data are standardized 
at the corresponding five-digit NACE industry level. Finally, Franck and 
Huyghebaert account for the fact that a substantial percentage of start-up 
firms leave the sample in the first few years after start-up, thereby potentially 
inducing an attrition bias. For this purpose, they use a two-step procedure 
where annual inverse Mills ratios are calculated based on year-by-year failure 
regressions, to test the robustness of their findings.
In support of the financial pressure hypothesis, the data reveal that business 
start-ups with higher leverage in one year report a higher ratio of EBITDA 
to total assets in the subsequent year. Also, more highly indebted business 
start-ups exhibit higher growth in earnings, as captured by their EBITDA 
growth rate. This positive effect of leverage on firm profitability and growth 
in earnings is robust to also including short-term bank loans in the definition 
of leverage. It continues to hold when firm performance and the explanatory 
variables are standardized at the corresponding five-digit NACE industry 
level. Lastly, it is also robust to correcting for a potential attrition bias. 
From interacting leverage with firm age, Franck and Huyghebaert (2008) 
conclude that the positive effect of leverage on the ratio of EBITDA to total 
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of leverage on the EBITDA growth rate diminishes as newly established 
ventures mature. Overall, these findings do not support the idea that the 
pressure arising from debt markets becomes smaller once firms establish an 
operating and financial history. Rather, the data reveal that leverage has more 
long-lasting positive effects on firm performance. Indeed, when entrepreneurs 
in highly indebted business start-ups are maximizing the performance of their 
firm, the rate at which they are able to further improve profitability is likely 
to decline with firm age.
To test the predation hypothesis, Franck and Huyghebaert (2008) separately 
run their regression models for firms in low-debt industries and firms in 
high-debt industries, respectively. They use the sales-weighted industry 
debt ratio, again calculated as the ratio of long-term bank loans relative to 
total assets, to capture the overall indebtedness of industry incumbents. The 
sample is subsequently split into two subsamples, using the median value 
of this industry debt ratio. For high-debt industries, the empirical results 
reveal that the interaction term between leverage and the HHI concentration 
index is (marginally) significant, but positive. A positive coefficient on this 
interaction variable thus indicates that in high-debt industries, high-debt 
business start-ups outperform low-debt entrepreneurial ventures when the 
industry is highly concentrated and, thus, the number of rival firms is 
limited. Hence, this finding suggests that high-debt business start-ups are not 
targeted by rival predatory actions when industry rivals themselves are highly 
leveraged. What’s more, the data even point out that a lack of competition in 
product markets further strengthens the positive relation between leverage 
and post-entry performance for highly leveraged business start-ups, thereby 
suggesting that leverage can still incentivize entrepreneurs when disciplining 
from product markets is largely lacking.
For low-debt industries, the empirical results point out that the interaction 
term between leverage and the HHI concentration index is significantly 
negative. Under the assumption that the intensity of strategic interactions is 
stronger in low-debt industries, the negative effect of leverage times industry 
concentration n firm performance in low-debt industries suggests that highly 
indebted business start-ups find it more difficult to realize high profitability 
and growth in EBITDA over time when the odds of rival predatory actions 
are larger. Furthermore, the negative effects of industry concentration for 
high-debt ventures in low-debt industries decline as start-ups grow older, 
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Overall, the above results refine earlier findings by Huyghebaert and Van de 
Gucht (2004). The latter authors show that entrepreneurial business start-ups 
in highly competitive industries are more likely to exit and that firm leverage 
compounds this failure risk. Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004) do not 
consider the role of the debt ratio of industry incumbents, however. Yet, they 
do point out that start-up leverage negatively affects firm survival only when 
potential adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets 
are considerable at the moment of start-up. Under these circumstances, 
competitors can use aggressive strategic actions to impede future financing 
by negatively influencing creditors’ perceptions on entrepreneurial quality 
and/or firm behavior (e.g., expropriation). By adjusting their output or price 
in response to new firm entry, incumbent firms can negatively impact the 
cash flows of business start-ups, which could make financiers reluctant or 
unwilling to grant subsequent financing or roll over existing short-term 
debt contracts. In other words, incumbent strategic behaviour in the product 
market can further induce the exit of newly established entrepreneurial 
ventures through its impact on the financial markets so that firms are denied 
financial capital.
4. Conclusions
This paper argues that the capital structure of business start-ups is an 
endogenous result, where entrepreneurs as well as financiers try to maximize 
their utility. Entrepreneurs are concerned about firm survival, especially when 
they highly value private benefits of control. Banks wish to reduce their 
exposure to information and incentive problems. The outcome of this joint 
optimizing behavior is important, as it has implications for firm performance, 
growth and survival. On the one hand, entrepreneurs in highly indebted new 
ventures face stronger pressure from debt markets to increase post-entry 
performance in order to reduce the likelihood of adverse credit decisions 
and firm liquidation. The idea that leverage can improve firm performance is 
not new. It has long been recognized by researchers in corporate finance as 
a mechanism to reduce firm free cash flows and thus avoid over-investment 
in projects with a negative net present value. So, Franck and Huyghebaert 
(2008) point out that leverage has more general positive implications for firm 
performance that go beyond the reduction of managerial self-serving behavior, 33 Conclusions
as the incentives of the entrepreneurs in this sample are generally aligned with 
the maximization of shareholder value. Next, while the positive effects of 
leverage on profitability increase as start-ups grow older, the positive effects 
of leverage on growth in earnings decline with start-up age. Together, these 
findings indicate that highly indebted business start-ups continue to hold 
a strong focus on profit maximization as time goes by, so that their ability to 
realize further increases in earnings actually declines as firms grow older.
Besides, the results of Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004) and Franck 
and Huyghebaert (2008) point out that business start-ups may suffer from 
predation, especially in low-debt industries. Indeed, industry concentration 
tends to reduce the positive effects of leverage on post-entry performance 
(profitability and growth in earnings over time). Yet, this negative influence 
of industry concentration becomes smaller as start-ups grow older. Arguably, 
these results are consistent with the idea that information asymmetries between 
business start-ups and their bank incite rival firms to distort a start-up’s quality 
signals, being its earnings to its bank. Simultaneously, these results point out 
that predation is more likely to occur when rival firms can endure the adverse 
consequences of predatory actions for their own profitability and the benefits 
from predation are to be shared among only a limited number of industry 
incumbents. When information asymmetries between the start-up firm and 
its bank diminish over time, these effects decline too, consistent with the 
idea that low performance in one year is less likely to lead to adverse lending 
decisions by banks when the banking relationship has grown stronger and 
firms have easier access to other financing sources.
Arguably, these findings have implications for public policy. First, they suggest 
that in the start-up context, bank loans are an effective tool to force firms to 
maximize profitability, despite the fact that agency problems of equity are 
trivial because of high ownership concentration. Second, the results suggest 
that when the likelihood of predation is larger, highly indebted business 
start-ups are more likely to suffer. For these firms, having a low debt ratio is 
the optimal response to a stronger predatory threat, whereas high leverage is 
the best option for firms that face a low likelihood of rival predation.34
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1. Introduction
We are living a period of financial and economic crisis. It is accompanied 
by widespread pessimism and lack of confidence and trust. Under the 
circumstances it may appear out of place to focus on long run growth and 
innovation. Before addressing the topic of this Lecture I want to argue against 
such a perspective. In my view it is precisely in moments of crisis and turmoil 
that it is important to take a long run perspective.
Angus Maddison
1, among others, documents that from the earliest period 
on record up to the eighteenth century, the standards of living have been 
quite stable over the long run. Sharp variations in standards of living were 
associated with disease, famine and war. Nevertheless, they would not persist 
over the very long run. The Malthus / Ricardo model was able to reconcile 
long run stable standards of living with technological progress over time.
2 The 
Malthusian curse, that earned Economics the epithet “dismal science”, was 
1 Maddison,  Angus:  www.ggdc.net/maddison/
2  See Lucas (2002).40 Introduction
broken sometime in the 18
th century. Technological progress paced-up and 
a demographic transition led to a sharp slowdown in population. Demographic 
transition is compatible with an increased value of human capital.
In a recent paper with Gabriel Fagan and Peter McAdam, I have explored 
a mechanism for endogenous accumulation of knowledge proposed by 
Immanuel Kant in 1784
3. For Kant all progress starts from an idea in the 
mind of an individual. Individual effort depends on rivalry and competition. 
It relies also on co-operation. For example knowledge accumulates slowly 
(paraphrasing Kant each generation must educate the next). Kant’s mechanism 
can be seen as in line with much of modern endogenous growth literature.
Kant also emphasized the importance of a well-ordered society in order to 
channel individual effort to activities leading to progress. Kant’s mechanism 
is, in my view, fully in line with the contemporary analysis by Douglas North
4, 
who interprets the emergence of a rule of law protecting private property 
as a solution to a problem of commitment on the part of the sovereign. 
Specifically, the rule of law and primacy of private property emerged, in 
Europe, as a solution to the problem of how to ensure the availability of debt 
financing in the event of a war. Clearly if the sovereign were not constrained 
by any legal limits then it could not credibly promise to repay the debt: since 
it could always renege on promises ex post. The rule of law appears as one 
solution to a severe time-inconsistency problem affecting action on the part of 
the sovereign. Private property rights, in turn, are essential for enduring effort 
leading to progress. Similar points may be made on the basis of contributions 
as diverse as those of Max Weber, Joseph Schumpeter and John Hicks
5.
The engine of growth is a capitalist society based on competition and 
change. Joseph Schumpeter characterizes economic development as: “The 
spontaneous and discontinuous change […] which forever disturbs the 
equilibrium state that previously existed”.
6 
Nobel Prize winner Robert Solow
7 showed that for a sustained economic 
growth technological progress is more important than factor accumulation. For 
Schumpeter behind innovation (i.e. the economic application of technological 
improvements) lies entrepreneurship. Innovation involves the industrial or 
3  Fagan et al. (2008).
4 North  (1993).
5  Weber (1927); Schumpeter (1934); Hicks (1969). 
6 Schumpeter  (1934).
7 Solow  (1957).41 Introduction
commercial use of something new: a new good or service, a new production 
method, a new market or source of supply, a new form of organization or 
a new method of financial organization. For Schumpeter innovation is fraught 
with difficulties. One of them stems from the need for external financing (see 
Levine (2005) for a recent review of the literature on finance and growth, as 
well as Aghion and Howitt (2005)).
The rest of the Lecture is organized as follows. In section 2 we will look 
at the growth performance of the EU from a Schumpeterian perspective. 
We will emphasize the importance of Young Innovative Companies (YICs). 
In section 3 we will look at the evidence on the importance of financing 
constraints for YICs. We will be drawing on research in progress by Schneider 
and Veugelers (2008). Finally we will conclude.
2.  A Schumpeterian look at the growth performance
of the EU
After a long period of technological catch-up since the WWII, the productivity 
gap between Europe and the US began widening again in 1995. Structural 
conditions necessary for Europe to catch-up with the productivity leader, the 
US, were present from the end of the war to the first oil shock and afterwards. 
However, conditions needed for creation, innovation and leadership in 
a knowledge economy worked against Europe (relative to the US) in the more 
recent period.
The recovery of the US productivity growth in the post-1995 period, and the 
corresponding decline in the EU reflects the influence of key technology and 
policy factors. We discuss three interrelated determinants: ICT (information 
and communication technology), innovation and firm dynamics. 42 A Schumpeterian look at the growth performance of the EU
The role of ICT as a general purpose technology
in EU productivity growth
Sectoral data suggest that the divergence in productivity growth between the 
US and the EU in the post-1995 period is primarily explained by differences in 
the pattern of production and use of ICT (O’Mahoney and Van Ark (2003)).
•   Labour productivity growth in ICT producing manufacturing industries 
has been particularly high in both the US and the EU. However, the US 
benefited from a leading initial position and an increasing growth in the 
post-1995 period in high-tech industries such as office machinery, electronic 
valves & tubes, telecom equipment, TVs, and scientific instruments.
•   ICT using services have been the focus of the most profound technological 
gap with the US, particularly in the retail and wholesale sectors and in 
banking and finance. On the other hand, more restrictive regulatory barriers 
in European countries have been detrimental to the diffusion of ICT. 
More recent firm level evidence (Bloom et al. (2007)) confirms that the 
US productivity advantage is not only related to a higher ICT spending 
by US firms (in ICT using sectors). In addition, US firms as well as their 
subsidiaries operating outside the US-specific conditions reap a higher return 
from their ICT investments. This suggests that other firm-specific advantages 
are important, such as the quality of management practices (Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007)).
The importance of knowledge production and diffusion
In the present context one needs to define the extent to which the example 
of ICT is an isolated case or is likely to be replicated in other high-growth, 
high-tech industries
8.
Assuming that a failure of EU enterprises to recapture the full potential and 
benefits related to ICT is a credible risk, the following key questions arise:
(1) Does the EU have specific problems regarding its innovation infrastructure?; 
(2) Does the US have specific features/framework conditions which make it 
more likely to be the locus for the next future breakthroughs in technology?; 
(3) Why is the EU less apt to creating and exploiting new technologies 
8  This is a pertinent question if one accepts the contention of Gordon (2004), amongst others, 
that the US’s lead in ICT is not an isolated case.43 A Schumpeterian look at the growth performance of the EU
in general? In order to better understand the EU–US innovation deficit, 
discussion beyond ICT importance is needed. 
Figure 1: EU’s overall innovation performance relative to the US
EIS uses a composite indicator to assess Innovation (various innovation input and output measures)
Source: EIS 2006. 
Despite some signs of catching-up, Figure 1 confirms the presence of 
persistent innovation deficit in the EU. As this innovation indicator comprises 
several innovation input and output measures, the EU innovation gap goes 
beyond the deficit in R&D spending. The R&D deficit is a symptom rather 
than a cause of a weakness in the EU’s capacity to innovate; the cause is 
rooted in the structure and dynamics of industry and enterprise (O’Sullivan 
(2007)).
 
A comparison of innovation inputs shows that SMEs represent a larger share 
of R&D expenditures in the EU than in the US and Japan.On the other hand, 
EU SMEs are less R&D intensive than in the US, although the SME gap 
is similar to the overall gap in R&D spending. The average R&D intensity 
of SMEs in Europe is 0.34% versus 0.53% in the US. This compares to an 
overall average R&D intensity in Europe of 1.17% versus 1.57% in the US.
9
However, specific contribution of SMEs to innovation goes beyond the share 
of SMEs in R&D expenditures or in innovation output. SMEs have a very 
important indirect effect. Usually young small innovating firms create radical 
new technologies and markets, whose further developments are completed by 
large players. Baumol (2002) recognizes the complementarity between small 
9  Results are based on DG RTD (2007).44 A Schumpeterian look at the growth performance of the EU
and large firms, but at the same time notes the importance of small firms in 
large innovations.
10 According to Baumol, private sector innovations in the US 
come from two distinct sources, firstly from the activities of large firms and 
secondly from the efforts of independent inventors and their entrepreneurial 
partners. Baumol asserts that the active presence of both groups enhances 
the overall innovation process since their activities are complementary. 
Independent inventors/entrepreneurs specialise in breakthrough innovations 
while R&D departments of the larger firms enhance these breakthroughs and 
add to their overall usefulness.
Firm demography and the creative destruction process in Europe
EU-US productivity growth differences can be additionally explained by 
(a change in) firm demography (Bartelsman et al. (2004)). The churning 
process has substantial effects on labour productivity growth because large 
part of it results from reallocations from less productive to more productive 
firms. Industries and/or countries where the churning process is inhibited, 
exhibit lower productivity and employment rates.
All European industries exhibit a greater number of small firms and also 
a higher share in total employment than in the US. American manufacturing 
firms are larger and they display wider size dispersion, particularly in 
high-tech sectors and in wholesale and retail.
Figure 2 on aggregate entry, exit and net entry rates from the research work of 
Cincera and Galgau (2005) shows that although both entry and exit rates are 
lower in the EU than in the US, the differences in exit rates are substantially 
larger. The average size of entrants is much smaller in the US. Lower entry 
as well as lower exit (firing) costs in the US allow benefiting from the 
experimentation process supplied by the market (Poschke (2006)). While 
there is a high positive correlation between the entry and exit in the US, 
correlation is insignificant in the EU and even negative in France, Italy and 
Portugal. A positive correlation reflects churning of firms within sectors as 
a part of the creative destruction process. A negative correlation reflects more 
traditional sectoral shocks (positive for entry, negative for exit).
10 In 1994 the Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy prepared a list of 
breakthrough innovations made by small firms during the 20
th century (reported in Baumol, 
(2002)). It is impressive going literally from A (airplane) to Z (zipper) with many innovations 
that have been crucial to the economy. Other studies on the distribution of innovations certified 
as “significant” by industry experts, confirmed that small (as well as large) firms outperform 
medium-sized firms for the US (see OECD (2006) for an overview).45 A Schumpeterian look at the growth performance of the EU
Figure 2: Aggregate entry, exit and net entry rates (in %) by country (1997–2003)
Source: “Impact of Market Entry and Exit on EU Productivity Growth Performance”, M. Cincera and
O. Galgau (2005), EC Economic Papers 222.
Post entry performance also differs between Europe and the US as shown 
in Figure 3 on net employment gains amongst surviving firms at different 
limits from the empirical research of Bartelsman et al. (2004). The short term 
survival rate (2 years) for American entrants is very low, but after this market 
experimentation period, the conditional survival rate of successful firms 
becomes high. In addition, the growth for firms that survive for 7 years is 
higher in the US than in Europe. These results are a clear indication that there 
are also higher barriers to growth for SMEs in Europe.
Figure 3: Net employment gains among surviving firms at different lifetimes
(net gains as a ratio of initial employment)
Source: Excerpt from Bartelsman et al. (2004).46 A Schumpeterian look at the growth performance of the EU
2.1. The impact of the creative process on productivity growth
The overall labour productivity growth originates mainly in growth of 
incumbent firms, both in the US and the European manufacturing sector. 
However, the EU-US differential growth performance can be explained by 
the reallocation effect between firms and the net entry component. This seems 
to be a clear indication that creative destruction process is less effective in 
European countries than in the US in both low and high tech industries.
•   The exit effect is always positive, both in the US and the EU, which means 
that exiting firms are the least productive firms.
•   The long-run effect of entry on aggregate manufacturing productivity 
growth has a smaller magnitude in the EU than in the US (Bartelsman 
et al. (2004)). Furthermore, Aghion et al. (2003) show that the effect of 
entry depends on the industry’s distance to the technology frontier. The 
positive effect of entry on productivity growth is more significant the closer 
a country or sector is to the technological frontier.
•   In high-tech sectors, the entry effect is positive in all countries and this 
suggests an important role for new firms in more technology intensive 
industries. In these industries, the entry effect is much stronger in the US 
than in the European countries. Similar observations apply to exit barriers. 
•   New and small firms contribute to aggregate productivity growth directly 
through their own growth performance, and indirectly by affecting growth of 
large incumbents. Thus, the US firms’ post-entry growth and productivity 
performance is higher. Moreover, beneficial interactions between small and 
large firms, especially in sectors where technical ideas and innovations are 
an important ingredient of growth, could be at the heart of different effects 
that entry has on aggregate productivity growth.
In summary, Europe’s growth gap results partly from an inappropriate 
industrial structure in which small and new firms, occupying the main part 
of total employment, fail to play a significant role in the dynamics of the 
industry, especially in the high-tech intensive sectors. This is illustrated by 
their inability to enter, but most importantly, for the most efficient innovative 
entrants, to grow. The churning that characterizes the creative destruction 
process in a knowledge based economy encounters significant obstacles in the 47 A Schumpeterian look at the growth performance of the EU
EU, suggesting barriers to growth for small innovating firms which ultimately 
weakens Europe’s growth potential.
Economic analysis suggests the following “problem drivers” for the insufficient 
exit and low post-entry growth:
•   weaker product market competition (e.g. barriers to cross- border trade in 
services, national regulations, etc);
•   protection of inefficient firms through subsidies, bail-outs, etc.;
•   labour market and other regulations that kick in when a firm grows beyond 
a certain size threshold;
•  financial market developments.48
3.  Financing of small and young innovative companies
The literature generally supports the importance of new, young and therefore 
often still small firms for innovations and growth, even if they are small in 
number. Therefore, factors that would inhibit these small, young companies 
to innovate and grow can have a huge public impact.
In the analysis of the (failing) contribution of small and young firms to 
innovation and growth, access to finance is a priority issue. Survey data 
for the EU confirm the importance of access to finance. Excessively high 
economic risks are the major hampering factors for innovation for all types 
of firms, but somewhat more for small than for large firms. A second tier of 
barriers is formed by the access to skills, which again impedes both small as 
well as large firms. Regulatory burden is also included in the second tier 
of barriers. The empirical evidence suggests that this burden is somewhat 
stronger for small firms.
Table 1: Proportion of enterprises that regard selected hampering factors as highly 





























Lack of customer 
responsiveness 
to new goods or 
services
Small 16 21 16 6 13 5 5 10 8
Medium-
sized 13 19 13 5 14 4 4 8 6
Large 18 21 10 6 13 3 4 7 5
Source: Eurostat (2004).
Analysis of survey data on firms’ financial constraints perceptions show that 
age of the firm, which reflects its reputation, is more important than its size 
in determining the degree to which the firm feels financially constrained. 
A possible interpretation of this result is that age might reflect reputation of the 
firm which, in turn, significantly affects access to finance [see BEPA (2008)]. 
The access to finance barrier can be associated with a market failure. Risk and 
informational asymmetries create capital market imperfections, and a firm’s lack 
of reputation and collateral become crucial elements. Existing literature 49 Financing of small and young innovative companies
demonstrates substantial differences between small and large firms in this 
respect. Hall (2005) shows that imperfections in capital markets usually affect 
small firms more than large ones which can rely on internal financing. With, 
Young firms are even more likely to be constrained than other small firms as 
reputation and collateral are important to mitigate capital market imperfections. 
More radical investment projects further exacerbate the imperfect, incomplete 
and asymmetric information problem. Thus, young innovative companies, 
which combine the disadvantages of a small scale, a short history, less retained 
earnings and more risky innovative projects, are even more likely to be 
financially constrained than other small or young or innovating firms.
Along with this financial market failure, particular for the EU, stands the 
highly  fragmented nature of its venture capital market with 27 different 
operating environments adversely affecting both fundraising and investing. 
Complexity in operating across borders means that some funds have 
difficulties in expanding, growing and reaching a critical mass. This makes 
access to financing even more difficult and more expensive in the EU.
Financing of young innovative companies in the EU:
some empirical evidence from West Germany
Despite the high policy relevance, surprisingly little empirical evidence 
exists to support the failing contribution of small entrepreneurial companies 
to innovative performance in Europe. We present main findings of a recent 
interesting and relevant work produced internally and co-authored by 
a researcher from the Catholic University of Leuven. Schneider and Veugelers 
(2008) provide some empirical evidence on the innovative performance of 
young, small innovative companies (YICs), using firm level evidence from 
Germany, i.e., the 2005 wave of the German Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS 4). This data set allows the authors to: 
(i)   identify YICs for Germany on the characteristics of size, age and 
innovation profile; 
(ii)   characterize whether YICs are more constrained by barriers for innovation 
and econometrically investigate whether YICs are more constrained by 
access to finance than other innovators;
(iii)   econometrically investigate whether YICs are indeed more likely to be 
innovation performing, and particularly more likely to introduce radical 
innovations.50 Financing of small and young innovative companies
3.1. Characterizing YICs
The authors follow the recently revised European Commission’s State Aid 
rules to characterize YICs
11 which allows a more favourable treatment of 
national governments to provide R&D subsidies and tax incentives to YICs. 
The YIC dummy takes a value of 1 if an innovation active company is less 
than 6 years old, has less than 250 employees and spends at least 15% of its 
revenues on R&D.
Out of their sample of 1342 German innovation-active companies, only 
51 companies qualify for YIC status, using our EU State Aid definition. 
This confirms the “rareness” of YICs, representing only 3.8% of all 
innovation-active companies in West-Germany in 2005. Even within the 
group of small innovators or young innovators, YICs are rare (4.3% and 24%, 
respectively).
A “typical” YIC has a micro size, with about 20 employees. This is considerably 
smaller than other innovating SMEs, as well as young innovators. Also on 
R&D intensity and basicness of its R&D profile, a “typical” YIC scores much 
higher than any of these reference categories. These statistics confirm that it 
is a combination of age, size and R&D profile that composes the particularity 
of YICs. YICs are not the same as innovative SMEs or young innovators. 
Finally, YICs are overrepresented in knowledge-intensive, technological 
sectors, specifically services (ICT and R&D engineering) while they are 
absent in more traditional manufacturing industries.
3.2. YICs and barriers to innovation
Table 2 presents the results on whether YICs perceive differently obstacles 
to innovation. Respondents were asked to give a score to each (potential) 
hampering factor on a scale going from zero (not relevant) to three (high). 
The first column indicates the share of firms that considered this factor to be 
relevant (i.e. firms that scored one or more), while the second column reports 
the mean score.
11 Young Innovative Companies are defined in the EU State Aid Rules as small Enterprises, 
less than 6 years old, having being “certified” by external experts on the basis of a business plan, 
as capable of developing products or processes which are technologically new or substantially 
improved and which carry a risk of technological or commercial failure, or have R&D intensity of 
at least 15% in the last three years or currently (for start-ups).51 Financing of small and young innovative companies
Table 2: Obstacles to innovation
YICs Other Innovators







External financial constraints 95.65% 2.283 75.75% 1.234 –1.049***
Internal financial constraints 93.30% 2.457 66.42% 1.382 –1.074***
Innovation costs too high 93.33% 2.356 87.71% 1.862 –0.493***
Source: Schneider and Veugelers (2008)
As expected, YICs face, on average, higher obstacles to innovation than 
other innovating firms. When comparing across barriers, results confirm 
the presumption that financial constraints (both internal and external) are 
the most important barriers to innovation for YICs. Although this ranking 
also holds for other innovating firms, the YIC-differential is the largest and 
strongly statistically significant on both financial constraints.
For internal and external financial constraints, a YICs differential effect 
survives an econometric analysis, correcting for other firm and industry 
characteristics. Table 3 provides results from an ordered probit model to 
explain the importance of access to finance (internal and external) as a barrier 
to innovation. Results confirm that small innovators are more likely to be 
financially constrained (both internally and externally), and so are innovators 
that have a more basic innovative profile. Furthermore, YICs are significantly 
more likely to be financially constrained. These results therefore support the 
case for public policy attention to access to finance for YICs.52 Financing of small and young innovative companies
Table 3: Econometric evidence on YICs and financial constraints
Internal financial Constraints External financial Constraints
 Variables Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D.
log(age) –0.009 0.034 –0.017 0.035
log(employment) –0.106 *** 0.019 –0.150 *** 0.019
R&D intensity 0.246 0.203 0.292 0.207
YICs 0.780 *** 0.206 0.516 *** 0.200
Basic R&D reliance 0.175 ** 0.077 0.191 ** 0.078
Industry dummies Included Included
Threshold 1 –0.896 0.238 –1.052 0.242
Threshold 2 0.010 0.237 –0.282 0.241




Source: Schneider and Veugelers (2008)
To summarize, the evidence presented in Schneider and Veugelers (2008) 
show that Young Innovative Companies, combining newness, smallness 
and high R&D intensity, are rare in the sample of innovative firms. They 
view financial constraints, both internal and external, as an important factor 
hampering their innovation activities, significantly more so than other 
innovation active firms.53
4. Conclusions
We have argued that innovation is an important determinant of competitiveness 
and important to address global challenges, such as sustainable development. 
The importance of innovation has been reinforced by a fast development 
of new technologies (ICTs in particular), which enabled new forms of 
competition and opened new markets for creation of innovative products. 
Nevertheless, despite importance of innovation, as well as new opportunities 
offered by globalisation and new technologies, improvement in productivity 
in the EU, the EU seems to be lagging behind the US in this area.
We try to document the importance of SMEs and young innovative companies 
(YICs) for innovation process. Both of them are source of dynamism and in 
particular, YICs are directly related with research activities and are a key 
component of the innovation system, facilitating the emergence of new 
products and markets. However, evidence shows that in Europe small and new 
firms fail to play a significant role in the dynamics of the industry, although 
they account for a majority of employment. Not only they face significant 
entry barriers, but also successful entrants face difficulties to grow.
However, the ability of SMEs to grow depends highly on their potential to 
invest in restructuring, innovation and qualification. All of these investments 
require capital and therefore access to finance. Recent policy initiatives, such 
as the creation of the YICs status at the European level, aim at improving 
the financial environment for European entrepreneurial activity and more 
specifically to support newly-founded innovative firms in order to increase 
their global competitiveness and spur innovation.
Empirical research on access to finance for SMEs and young innovative 
companies has been limited, however, a recent analysis supported by German 
CIS data, confirms the presumption that young, small, innovation-intensive 
firms are a very small but distinct segment in the group of innovative companies. 
Furthermore, access to finance is the most important factor that hampers YICs’ 
innovation activities, significantly more than other innovating firms.54
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1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that the SME sector plays a central role in promoting 
employment, growth and innovation in Europe. Therefore, it is very important 
to ensure that financing conditions for SMEs are not overly tight because of 
more stringent capital rules, particularly when they already have difficulties in 
accessing finance in capital markets given their limited size and reputation.
SMEs in a number of EU countries have expressed concerns about the likely 
impact that the European version of the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) 
and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) could have on their access to 
credit and the related costs that this may entail. In this context it is useful to 
start with a brief history of the treatment of SME financing under Basel II.
In July 2002, the Basel Committee agreed to grant loans to SMEs under 
a special and more favourable treatment framework. According to the current 
Basel II and CRD proposals, SME funding by the banks using either the 
standardised or internal ratings-based (IRB) approach will in general be given 
a lower capital requirement than loans to larger firms. The capital savings, 
which may be as high as 20%, result from the application of a reduction 60 Introduction
mechanism (discount factor) that corrects the asset risk weights on the basis 
of the borrower’s size.
1 By allowing this special regime, the Basel Committee 
finally put an end to the long and heated debate that had flared up, particularly 
across Europe, after the release of the second consultation paper in January 
2001.
In theory, the SMEs’ concerns should have disappeared after they were 
accorded this preferential regulatory capital treatment. In practice, however, 
the new Capital Accord has introduced a very risk-selective approach: indeed, 
the more risk a borrower entails, the higher the capital charge will be. In 
other words, an SME that has a good business plan but inadequate equity and 
volatile cash-flows will accrue a higher cost of credit.
These concerns still have some foundation, as little is known about the 
immediate implications of new regulations when they are first introduced. 
These concerns may be alleviated, however, by becoming informed about the 
new regulation, its likely implications and the way in which banks will use 
internal rating systems to assess SME creditworthiness. 
This paper discusses the main characteristics of SME financing in Europe 
and provides an analysis of the impact of Basel II on SMEs credit financing 
conditions. Finally, it concludes with the key measures that should be taken 
by banks and SMEs and public policy-makers to improve SME financing in 
the new rating culture. 
1  The firm-size adjustment factor is an algorithm that modifies the asset correlation in reverse 
proportion to the SME’s size.61
2.  Sources of SME financing in Europe
Financing an SME generally depends on its sector of activity and its growth 
cycle.
2 In order to grow, a firm needs to be able to rely on equity and debt. 
Thus SMEs have a financial growth cycle in which financial needs and 
options change as the business grows and becomes more transparent.
Figure 1 shows this cycle in a stylised fashion, whereby firms lie on 
a size/age/information continuum. It seeks to give a general idea of which 
sources of finance become important at different stages in the financial 
growth cycle and the points in the cycle at which different types of funding 
are shown to begin and end.
At the beginning of the growth cycle, the financing of smaller and younger 
firms is heavily dependent on initial insider finance (equity) and external 
investors through, for example, angel financing.
3 (At this stage, these firms 
are an unknown quantity because they do not yet have a track record and 
therefore have much difficulty in accessing intermediated external finance.) 
Insider finance or equity is defined as funds provided by the start-up team, 
family or friends prior to and at the time of the firm’s inception. Angel 
financing is an informal, non-intermediated market for direct finance where 
‘angels’, who are by definition high net-worth individuals, invest directly 
in small companies through an equity contract, typically common stock. 
Angels sometimes work as a small investment group in which they coordinate 
their investment activities.
4 Sometimes this is done in conjunction with 
lawyers and accountants, who bring deal flair to the group and help structure
the contracts.
2  See Berger & Udell (1998).
3  See Sahlman (1990) and Wetzel (1994).
4  See Prowse (1998).62 Sources of SME financing in Europe
Figure 1. Firm continuum and sources of finance
Source: Berger & Udell (1998).
As firms grow, they gain access to intermediated finance on the equity side 
through venture capital, for example, and on the debt side through financial 
institutions and supplier credit. Venture capital (and trade credit) could 
typically come after the product or service has been successfully tested by 63 Sources of SME financing in Europe
the market and may be used to finance full-scale marketing and production. 
Eventually, if the firms survive and grow, they may access public equity and 
debt markets.
Trade (or supplier) credit is the credit the supplier gives to his client in 
a business-to-business relationship. Instead of paying for the goods and 
services rapidly in cash, the firm makes delayed payments to its suppliers, 
which creates the equivalent of a loan from the suppliers to the firm. The use 
of supplier credit depends on the length of payment period, the availability of 
the supplier’s own funds and also access to bank loans.
Suppliers are generally reluctant to grant trade credit to start-ups because of 
the lack of information about the firm and the higher probability of default. 
When companies grow and show stable cash-flows, trade credit becomes 
a viable and frequently used source of financing.
As firms continue to grow and achieve a level of production whereby their 
balance sheets reflect substantial, tangible business assets that could be 
pledged as collaterals and guarantees, they can tap other sources to obtain 
debt financing. Commercial, cooperative and savings banks, specialised 
finance companies and other financial institutions together provide most of 
the external debt finance.
Financial institutions provide two types of credit to SMEs: i) credit cards 
and credit lines,
5 and ii) mortgage loans,
6 equipment loans, motor vehicle 
loans, capital leases
7 and other types of loans. The former are typically 
used to finance working capital needs and are often collateralised by assets 
unrelated to the use of the credit line. Indeed, they could be guaranteed by one 
or more insider owners, which gives the financial institution the possibility 
of recourse to the personal wealth of the owners in the event the loan is not 
repaid. In many cases, the personal assets of the owners are explicitly pledged 
as collateral to back the loans (see Box 1). The latter are typically used to 
finance specific assets and are collateralised by the assets being financed 
5 The credit lines represent a loan commitment by the financial institution to provide future 
credit (these commitments may include short-term credit including overdrafts and long-term 
credit). 
6 Mortgages include both commercial and residential mortgages if the funds were used for 
business purposes. They may be secured by either commercial property or the personal property 
of the owner.
7  For most equipment loans, motor vehicle loans and capital leases, the proceeds of the loan 
or lease are used to purchase the assets pledged as collateral.64 Sources of SME financing in Europe
(commonly known as ‘asset-based financing’) such as accounts receivable, 
inventory and equipment.
Box 1. Differences between collaterals and guarantees
Collaterals and guarantees are powerful tools that allow the financial institutions to 
offer credit on favourable terms (since the collateral itself reduces the risk of the loan) 
and also to proceed to recovery in the event that the borrower is defaulting on his or 
her payments. Indeed, providing collateral or a guarantee is not only a pledge against 
default for the financial institution, but it is also a tool to reduce the informational 
opacity of small businesses. The lack of information might result in credit rationing or 
the extension of credit only on relatively unfavourable terms. 
There are two types of collateral: the collateral that involves pledged assets owned 
by the firms (these may include accounts receivable and/or inventory, referred to as 
‘asset-based lending’) and the collateral that involve pledging assets owned outside the 
firm, typically assets belonging to the firm’s owners. The monitoring of receivables and 
inventory may also produce valuable information about a firm’s future performance as 
well as information about the value of the collateral, which can be used as part of an 
overall relationship that may lead to more favourable credit terms in the future.
Guarantees give the lender general recourse against the assets of the principle owner or 
other party issuing the guarantee. A guarantee is similar to a pledge of outside personal 
collateral, but it differs in two important ways. First, it is a broader claim than the pledge 
of personal collateral since the liability of the guarantor is not limited to any specific 
asset. Second, a guarantee is a weaker claim than a pledge of collateral, against any 
given set of assets since a guarantee does not involve specific terms that prevent these 
assets from being sold or consumed. 
Specialised finance companies also play a key role in providing debt 
financing to SMEs.
Leasing involves a lease contract, i.e. an agreement between the owner of the 
asset, ‘the lessor’, and the user of the asset, the ‘lessee’, which conveys to the 
user the right to use the asset in return for a number of specified payments 
over the agreed period of time. Leasing is simply a way of acquiring an asset 
without paying cash, taking out a loan or using other forms of financing. For 
many SMEs, leasing is attractive because it frees up cash that would otherwise 
be tied up in fixed assets and would not be available to finance working 
capital. Moreover, leasing companies usually do not require collateral. Hence, 
in an environment where access to capital may be difficult owing to a lack of 
financial visibility and collateral, leasing may provide a useful complement 
or substitute to traditional bank financing.65 Sources of SME financing in Europe
Factoring involves the purchase (at a discount) of the accounts receivable
8 
of a firm by a third party (known as a ‘factor’). In the case of factoring, 
the underlying asset is sold to the factor, which means that in the event the 
borrower becomes insolvent, the underlying asset (the factored accounts 
receivable) is not part of the bankrupted estate. Obviously, in a factoring 
relationship, the credit is primarily based on the quality of the underlying 
accounts, not the quality of the borrower.
Financial institutions and other finance intermediaries often put considerable 
weight on the financial conditions and reputations of the insider-owners and 
also on the relationship they have with them when making any investment 
decision. Generally, the creditworthiness of the enterprise or the entrepreneur 
is easily evaluated using modern credit-coring techniques when a long credit 
history, pledgeable assets and personal data are available.
3.  Use and structure of SME financing in Europe
A higher equity share within an SME could reduce the risk of an investment 
and provide a firm with wider access to external finance. According to the 
European Commission,
9 among the different external financing sources, 
those most frequently used are overdrafts, bank loans, leasing and factoring. 
Other sources include external investors and subventions. Nevertheless, the 
majority of European SMEs depend strongly on bank financing (through 
bank loans and overdrafts).
The availability of equity to SMEs varies among European countries and 
among the different firm sizes (Table 1). In some countries such as Germany, 
Italy and Austria, SMEs rely much less on their own capital, while in 
France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal, the share of equity in the total balance 
sheet ranges between 39% and 42%. These differences can be attributed to 
differences in taxation, financial systems and legal frameworks (including the 
minimum equity requirements for some companies such as start-ups). History 
and culture play an important role, especially in the case of family ownership 
and reputation in some specific activities.
8  That is, the sale payments due from customers. 
9  European Commission (2001).66 Use and structure of SME financing in Europe
Table 1. Share of equity in the total balance sheet by enterprise size (%)
Size by turnover (millions) Austria Belgium France Germany  Italy Portugal  Spain
Less than €7m  13 40 34 14 26 31 42
Between €7m and €40m  27 38 35 22 25 40 43
€40m and more 31 39 35 31 28 51 37
All sizes 28 39 35 30 27 42 38
Source: European Commission (2001).
In general, overdrafts offer short-term lending that can be used at very short 
notice (or without any notice period at all). Although they are more expensive 
than bank loans, they are often preferred by enterprises because of their 
higher flexibility.
10 Banks typically charge 8–20% for overdrafts when there 
is an explicit agreement on the threshold. This rate could jump even higher 
when exceeding the agreed amount.
Bank loans have longer maturity and their charges depend on the interest 
rates. The environment of low interest rates and inflation experienced over 
the past few years in the economic and monetary union (EMU) have brought 
down the rates for bank loans. This means that SMEs can obtain medium- and 
long-term bank loans at rates that vary between 5–7% (which is 3–4% above 
the interbank rates).
11
In terms of banking relationships, in several member states such as Austria 
and Germany, enterprises have traditionally relied on a close relationship 
with one local bank (the Hausbank), which covers relatively small credit 
amounts (< €100,000) and is willing to lend even when business conditions 
are difficult. As shown by the ENSR survey
12 (2002) (see Table 2), 52% of 
the micro-enterprises rely on one bank, but one-third of the medium-sized 
enterprises also have a relationship with only one bank. At a country level, 
Denmark (with approximately 90%) and Norway (with 80%) show the 
highest percentages of SMEs having credit lines with only one bank. By 
contrast, in several southern European countries, SMEs tend to have credit 
lines with several banks. In Spain for example, only about one-third of the 
SMEs have credit lines with one bank, which is similar to Greece (37%)
and Italy (38%).
10  European Commission (2001).
11 In May 2005 the one-year interbank rates in the euro area (the Euribor-Euro Interbank 
Offered Rate) were at their lowest level (almost 2%) since the beginning of the 1990s. 
12  European Commission (2003).67 Use and structure of SME financing in Europe
Table 2. Percentage of SMEs with credit lines, by number of banks
and size class in the EU–19
Number of banks < 10 employees 10–49 employees 50–249 employees
Only one bank 52 39 33
Two to three banks 38 42 31
Four or more banks  6 11 22
No answer 4 7 14
Total* 100 100 100
*The sum of each column is not always 100%, due to the rounding.
Source: ENSR Enterprise Survey (2002).
As for the amount of credit, almost 60% of the SMEs responding to this 
question in the ENSR survey have bank liabilities of up to €100,000, another 
16% have bank liabilities between €100,000 and €500,000, about 3% have 
bank liabilities between €500,000 and €1 million, and only 1% have more 
than that. Finally, with regard to the maturity period of their loans, most of 
the SMEs’ largest bank loans have a maturity period of over three years. As 
Table 3 shows, the focus on short-term financing is most pronounced in the 
wholesale sector, whereas loans of five years and more are frequently used in 
the personal services sector.
With respect to alternative financing sources to bank loans, the use of leasing 
seems to be increasing in Europe. It is most often used to acquire goods with 
a substantial second-hand value (such as cars, real estate, machinery, etc.). 
The main disadvantage of leasing is that the ‘effective’ interest rate is usually 
higher compared with bank loans. Still, leasing is an interesting source of 
funding especially for SMEs and enterprises that have low revenues but high 
growth opportunities. In the EU, leasing rose in 2001 by about 8.5% compared 
with 2000 – in real terms, this equates to €193 billion.
13 In many countries, 
leasing seems to be used particularly by fast-growing SMEs (especially those 
in Belgium, Finland, Ireland and Spain). 
13  See Leaseurope (2002). 68 Use and structure of SME financing in Europe
Table 3. Maturity period for the largest SME bank loans and sector













< than 6 months  7 7 1895968
6 months–1 year 9 7788557
1–3 years 14 22 14 14 18 17 18 17
3–5 years 26 26 18 23 26 18 16 21
5 years or longer 21 24 22 26 29 28 43 27
No answer 24 15 21 21 14 22 22 20
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: ENSR Enterprise Survey (2002).
According to the Observatory of European SMEs (European Commission 
(2003)), incorporating findings from the Exco Grant & Thornton Survey of 
European SMEs (2001),
14 about 11% of SMEs in Europe use factoring, but 
considerable differences can still be observed across countries. Whereas it is 
estimated that 32% of SMEs in France use factoring, it is hardly ever used 
in Sweden (only 3%).
15 Factoring is considered to be more suitable for small 
enterprises and on average 50% of the total number of European factoring 
companies’ clients have an annual turnover of less than €2 million, with 
91% having less than €15 million.
16 Despite the fact that it has been used for 
nearly 40 years, the average penetration rate of factoring is relatively low 
(only 11%). The low penetration rate of factoring can be readily confirmed 
when looking at the World Bank’s World Factoring Yearbook – 2003.
17 When 
measuring the relative importance of factoring to GDP, the factoring rate did 
not reach 5.4% in Europe
18 in 2002.
Finally, the use of trade credit has been growing among European SMEs (see 
Table 4). In a survey
19 conducted by Intrum Justitia (2005), trade credit was 
ranked as the primary financing source above bank and other debt financing. 
Indeed, for a considerable number of SMEs, trade credit is a more important 
source of working capital than bank loans.
14  The survey was based on 4,400 replies from a sample of 42,400 enterprises. 
15  See the European Business Survey by Grant Thornton (2001). 
16  Greater London Enterprise Ltd., Analysis of Use of Factoring, Brussels (2003). 
17  See World Bank (2004).
18  This includes the EU-25 plus Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey. 
19 The survey was conducted in 23 European countries in February 2005. More than 6,500 
companies took part in the survey. 69 Use and structure of SME financing in Europe
Table 4  Amounts owed to trade creditors due and payable within one year,











Belgium 17.18 20.98 21.11 28.84 17.55 22.97
France 25.55 25.88 28.70 32.5 24.78 19.23
Finland 7.36 3.92 20.47 13.4 11.12 5.72
Germany 13.23 10.80 24.21 19.01 na na
Italy 23.94 26.46 31.82 39.99 13.89 21.76
Netherlands na 8.37 na 7.75 na 7.3
Portugal 16.05 15.56 27.73 26.78 10.61 3.5
Spain 21.04 19.33 27.35 26.33 11.17 5.24
Sweden 10.84 16.93 18.01 22.24 10.68 11.67
a Data refers to 1999. 
b Manufacturing refers to the following sectors of NACE Rev. 1: 13–22 and 24–36.
c Retail trade refers to the following sectors of NACE Rev. 1: 52.1–52.6 + 50.5.
d Transportation and communications refers to the following sectors of NACE Rev. 1: 60–64.
Notes:   “Small” refers to enterprises with an annual turnover of less than €7 million; “medium” refers to 
enterprises with an annual turnover of between €7 million and €40 million.
Source: BACH Database, August 2003.
Trade credit is easily accessible even under conditions of slow growth or 
recession when banks become more reluctant to lend. The charges involved 
in this form of financing include the financing cost and a risk premium. 
Frequently, a cash discount for immediate payment is offered by the supplier, 
which if not used by the client constitutes an additional cost. Further, many 
SMEs are not able to pay their suppliers on time before they are paid by their 
customers owing to liquidity constraints. The same survey confirmed that 
a large proportion of companies are forced to pay invoices later because they 
are not able to generate sufficient cash-flow.
Not surprisingly, the amounts owed to trade creditors are larger in countries 
with longer payment periods
20 (Table 5). The effective payment periods differ 
by country: for example, in 2002, it took on average 87 days before payment 
was made in Italy (corresponding to a delay of 21 days), whereas in Sweden, 
firms collect their debts within an average of 34 days (corresponding to 
20 The payment period is part of the contract between the supplier and client. The difference 
between the contractual or target payment period and the effective period is the payment delay 
(late payments). In other words, suppliers offer their customers a payment delay but the latter do 
not always pay on time; therefore they automatically obtain extra credit. 70 Use and structure of SME financing in Europe
a delay of only 8 days). This trend is confirmed by the Intrum Justitia survey 
(2005), which revealed that invoices in the Nordic countries are generally 
paid with a delay of one week with respect to the agreed terms, while in 
southern countries such as Italy and Spain, delays average between two and 
three weeks – with the notable exception of Portugal, where payments are 
made up to five weeks after the due date. The same survey in 2005 showed 
an overall increase of the average payment duration to 57.4 days in 2004 as 
compared with 56.2 days in 2003.
Table 5  Payment behaviour in Europe in 2001–02 (in days) 
Payment target Payment delay Total
2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2004*
Italy 64 66 24 21 88 87 91.7
Belgium 41 39 20 22 61 61 58.7
France 45 46 12 10 57 56 58.7
UK 29 31 28 23 57 54 51.4
Netherlands 26 26 21 20 47 46 58.7
Germany 23 23 18 17 41 40 41.1
Austria 25 27 13 10 38 37 41.1
Switzerland 24 22 16 14 40 36 41.1
Sweden 24 26 8 8 33 34 31.8
* Data for 2004 from Intrum Justitia (2005).
Source: Creditreform (2003).
Comparing the composition of external financing resources among European 
countries, no single pattern emerges (Table 6). In Spain, France, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Portugal, leasing is used more often than overdrafts, 
while factoring seems to be especially important in France. In other countries 
such as Denmark, Italy, Ireland and Sweden, enterprises have a particular 
preference for using overdrafts to finance their businesses. 
Overall, according to the Exco, Grant & Thornton survey of SMEs (2001), 
46% of European SMEs rely on bank loans, 50% use overdrafts, 39% use 
leasing and some 11% use factoring. Hence, the strong reliance on loan 
finance implies an equally strong need for collateral to secure access to loans 
for healthy businesses.71 Use and structure of SME financing in Europe




Factoring Bank loans Subventions
Belgium 37 25 12 4 56 14
Denmark 73 25 13 7 24 7
Germany 47 43 5 2 66 7
Greece 23 15 10 8 68 12
Spain 8 48 15 15 58 10
France 36 47 7 32 63 11
Ireland 70 48 19 14 39 10
Italy 78 41 7 17 17 10
Luxembourg 22 33 15 11 44 15
Netherlands 17 31 11 3 50 9
Austria 42 39 1 6 65 8
Portugal 16 47 7 10 48 6
Finland 46 27 15 14 64 11
Sweden 70 29 10 3 27 6
UK 59 42 11 7 34 10
Total EU-15 50 39 9 11 46 9
Source: Exco, Grant & Thornton survey of SMEs (2001).72
4.  The main constraints to SME financing by banks
Traditionally, SMEs seem to have suffered problems when looking for 
external financing. For them the cost of borrowing (interest rates and 
charges) is an important issue. Despite the steady decline of interest rates 
in the euro area during the past few years, external finance tends to be more 
expensive for smaller firms than for large ones, as the fixed costs of lending 
(administrative costs, the cost of collecting information and the risk premium) 
are not proportional to the size of the loan.
21
According to the 2002 ENSR survey, 36% of the respondents were dissatisfied 
with their banks because they considered the interest rates to be too high, 51% 
of them thought that bank charges were far too high and 59% were dissatisfied 
with their bank’s services.
22
Some experts
23 attribute the high lending costs to a lack of competition among 
lenders in certain regions, which enables them to charge interest rates that 
are in excess of what the underlying credit risk requires. Small businesses 
are usually dependent on small local banks, because of their local knowledge 
and experience, which in turn strengthens the bank-firm relationship and 
contributes to reducing information asymmetry; but on the other hand, this 
tends to create market power, allowing a possible extraction of the surplus 
from SMEs.
To illustrate the financing constraints facing SMEs, the results of a survey 
undertaken by the European Observatory of SMEs (European Commission 
(2003))
24 indicate that about 30% of firms with fewer than 50 employees felt 
that access to finance was the major constraint to the development of their 
business (Figure 2).
21 See  Wagenvoort  (2003c).
22  Efforts have been undertaken, however, by some countries such as Ireland to improve the 
bank-client relationship. Indeed, the enterprise support unit of the Bank of Ireland introduced 
a relationship-management approach to the benefit of both the bank and their clients. This 
approach is complemented by a range of financial and advisory services geared to the particular 
circumstances of start-ups and developing enterprises, and also includes ‘first-step’ loans, which 
are interest-free for a three-year period (European Commission, 2003).
23 See Berger et al. (1998) for evidence in the US and Schure, Wagenvoort and O’Brien 
(2004) for evidence in Europe. 
24  The survey covered 7,600 SMEs in 19 European countries (see also European Commission, 
2000 and 2002).73 The main constraints to SME financing by banks
In terms of the business growth cycle, there are also variations among 
companies at different points in their development as to how much bank 
credit is perceived as the main obstacle to their growth (see Table 7).
The availability of bank financing is also contingent on the growth rate 
of bank lending in relation to the overall business cycle and also to the 
bank’s lending approach. 
Figure 2. Share of firms that consider access to finance to be the major business 
constraint, by size (%)
Table 7. Main financial obstacles to growth at the different development stages of 
companies (%)
Company 
obstacles  Early stage Limited 
growth Very innovative Strong growth
Financing as the 
main obstacle 22 8 16 19
Bank credit  40 40 47 50
Bank guarantees  33 37 44 48
Personal 
guarantees  25 26 36 39
Guarantees on 
fixed assets  45 5 7
Source: European Commission (2003).
In the past few years, the growth rate of bank lending has slowed – reflecting 
the weak economic cycle and lower demand as well as more selective lending 
– to the extent that SMEs have feared a potential ‘credit crunch’. This trend 
was not, however, indicative of banks refusing to grant credit to SMEs, 
but rather evidence of a more cautious lending approach as banks sought 
higher profitability and to meet greater risk-management requirements. On 74 The main constraints to SME financing by banks
the contrary, the EIB survey (2003) of some 70 European banks showed an 
increase of credit volumes to consumers and businesses during the period 
2000–02. Similarly, another survey conducted by McKinsey & Company for the 
European Commission (2005c) (hereafter referred to as ‘the McKinsey & Co. 
survey’) shows that banks view the SME credit business as a core element of 
their portfolio and want to increase their growth in this sector.
25
Looking at the reasons that impede lending to small and medium-sized 
firms (Figure 3), those banks interviewed by the EIB survey identified four 
obstacles ranked by their level of relevance:
1)  lack of equity in the client’s firm, 
2)  high credit risk,
3)  availability of adequate collateral and 
4)  poor information on the client’s firm. 
As shown in Figure 3, there are striking differences among the obstacles 
identified in relation to the development of bank lending to firms of varying 
sizes. For example, the lack of equity, company risk and available collateral 
are the main problems for SME financing, whereas low expected profitability 
is the main brake on financing for large firms. Each of these issues is 
examined below.
Figure 3. Main obstacles to the development of bank lending to firms
Lack of equity. As discussed in the previous section, the average rate of 
equity financing is usually low in Europe, owing to the long-anchored loan 
25 This survey was conducted with a sample of 44 large and 1,000 medium-sized European 
banks, in which 33 large and 71 small and medium-sized banks responded. The participating banks 
cover 39% of European banking assets. For more details, see European Commission (2005b).75 The main constraints to SME financing by banks
financing tradition. The availability of equity in SMEs varies among countries 
and depends on the SME’s size. As previously noted in Table 6, equity shares 
vary between 13% and 51% in Europe. In France, Belgium and Portugal, for 
example, equity financing is more prevalent but still it represents one-third of 
the total balance sheet. This variation is primarily a result of heterogeneous 
tax laws among the member states, which may be more favourable in some 
countries such as Belgium
26 and less favourable in others such as Germany.
High credit risk. When launching a new business or an innovative project, 
the entrepreneur is normally better informed about the project risks than those 
financing it. This may prevent lenders from observing the real nature of the 
borrower or influencing the borrower’s strategic behaviour after the credit 
is released. As a result, the lender could voluntarily raise the risk premium 
on loans to properly manage its risks,
27 which translates into higher interest 
rates for borrowers. This situation may trigger an adverse-selection effect that 
encourages riskier behaviour owing to the moral hazard principle, which in turn 
enhances the probability of default and may encourage credit rationing. Indeed, 
the borrower may suffer from credit rationing as they may not be able to obtain 
as much credit as they want even though they are willing to pay the interest rate 
set by their lenders or meet extra conditions to ensure their solvability.
28
In view of the upcoming regulatory changes for European banks (Basel 
II and the CRD), the proper management of credit risk will be even more 
important than it is today. Hence, banks will rely on more sophisticated risk-
management techniques and extensive information on the borrower to derive 
the probabilities of default and other risk parameters.
Availability of adequate collateral. A bank is inclined to ask for collateral to 
reduce the loan loss in the event of default. For an SME, however, providing 
collateral is not always an easy task,
29 especially the type that protects the 
26 It is commonly known that tax regimes in the UK and Ireland are more favourable to the 
establishment of SMEs, but no data on the average rate of equity financing were available. 
27  Governments in many countries are aware of the negative effect that credit rationing has on 
SME growth and have undertaken initiatives to address the perceived funding gap in their national 
economies. These include investing in loans and equity guarantee schemes, venture capital trusts, 
grants, equity investments and other programmes.
28 The theoretical literature on credit rationing as a result of asymmetric information was 
initiated by Stiglitz & Weiss (1981).
29  It is necessary to define what kinds of assets are acceptable collateral from the bank’s point 
of view. The most common form of collateral is real estate (either owned by the business or 
privately owned by the entrepreneur). It may also happen that SMEs assign private or personal 
savings books to banks as collateral. Other assets such as accounts receivable, inventories or fixed 
assets could serve as collateral if they fulfil specific conditions. 76 The main constraints to SME financing by banks
lender for the amount of risk taken.
30 This situation may explain why 23% 
(and 34%) of those SMEs employing between 0-9 employees and between 
10–49 employees respectively are not able to access bank loans according to 
the ENSR survey (2002).
Informational opacity. Small firms are considered to be more vulnerable 
than larger ones as they face less rigorous reporting requirements owing to 
their age and their short credit history. Indeed, unlike larger firms, small firms 
do not enter into contracts that are publicly visible and widely reported in the 
press – contracts with their labour force, their suppliers and their customers 
are generally kept private. In addition, small businesses do not issue traded 
securities that are continuously priced in public markets. Nor do they have 
audited financial statements that can be shared with any provider of outside 
finance. Some family-owned businesses, for example, are very reluctant to 
report strategic (sometimes considered to be confidential) information such 
as business structure, growth opportunities, strategic orientation and even 
ownership structure. As a result, small firms are often unable to convey 
their status in a credible way, and have more difficulty building a reputation 
to signal their high quality as a borrower. The inherent characteristics (and 
weaknesses) of SMEs in terms of size and limited access to capital markets 
feed their informational opacity, which may prevent easy access to sources of 
finance and in some cases makes financial contracting problematic.
According to the Observatory of European SMEs (European Commission, 
2003), the availability of information is a basic condition for granting loans to 
small- and medium-sized enterprises. But the evidence shows that banks only 
receive balance sheets and the profit and loss accounts from about two-thirds 
of their SME clients. More sophisticated documents such as budgets for 
the next few years, financial plans, cash-flow forecasts, information on 
inventories, unpaid invoices or qualitative information are seldom provided. 
Generally, the provision of all the information required is a perquisite to 
extend a loan or an overdraft.
Yet some improvements in the information flow have been observed in 
comparison with a few years ago. SMEs are becoming more proactive and 
they more readily deliver their financial statements and inform their banks 
about major developments in their businesses. Nevertheless, the information 
provided by SMEs is less sophisticated and less well-structured or validated 
as compared with the information provided by large enterprises. Small firms 
30 SMEs generally lack sufficient collateral. Yet even if collateral is available, an economic 
slowdown may have a negative effect on its value (European Commission, 2001).77 The main constraints to SME financing by banks
usually have small accounting departments or none at all. The entrepreneurs 
themselves may lack financial administrative skills or are so involved in 
day-to-day business matters that the documents required by the bank are 
often neglected. Entrepreneurs should overcome these weaknesses before the 
implementation of the new CRD in Europe. Indeed, providing balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts will be a standard requirement for all enterprises 
in Europe in order to have access to banking finance.
To explore the list of obstacles to SMEs financing, we conducted direct 
interviews with banking experts. According to them, the four factors 
mentioned above are not the only factors that impede the granting of loans. 
Poor business performance, a lack of entrepreneurial skills and uncertain 
development prospects are shown to be equally important. The first of 
these – poor business performance – can be indicated by a low equity ratio, 
insufficient cash-flow and liquidity problems. The latter two problems can be 
exacerbated by late payments as well as by bad credit management.
If some of these obstacles are assessed as being prevalent, many banks are not 
willing to provide or extend a credit line, even if the SME can offer enough 
collateral. For some existing clients, the reduction of current credit facilities is 
more likely to happen than a complete withdrawal of all facilities extended to 
the firm. This reduction is essentially a consequence of the bank’s assessment 
of the risk profile of the firm. The extension of existing credit lines to SMEs 
might become more difficult as a result of the more stringent regulatory 
conditions of the new capital requirement rules.
Based on the analysis above, it can be concluded that although alternative 
financing sources such as leasing, factoring and trade credit exist, SMEs 
rely heavily on bank financing. But bank financing requires a large volume 
of financial and strategic information that ought to be provided by SMEs to 
reduce the information gap between the borrower and its lender. In the face of 
the new requirements of Basel II globally and the new CRD in the EU, banks 
will have to reconsider their traditional approaches. Further, the new rules 
introduce stricter requirements to counter growing concerns about risks at the 
European and global levels. SMEs need to understand these regulatory changes 
as they will have some impact on their financing conditions, not necessarily 
by reducing their credit facilities but by rendering the whole process more 
risk-sensitive and dependent on the individual quality of the borrowers.78
5.  What is the likely impact of the CRD on SME financing 
in Europe?
In Europe, the majority of SMEs rely on loan financing as previously shown; 
however, another option exists for a bank – which is to finance companies 
through equity, either directly or through venture capital. Basel II and the 
CRD will impact SME financing, which may at a first sight raise some 
questions about the overall consequences of these changes. Although the new 
Basel capital rules will certainly impact the credit conditions for SMEs, they 
may not necessarily lead to a reduction of credit supply to these entities.
In terms of the cost of credit, Basel II will directly affect three components 
of the cost of credit to SMEs. First, the administrative or operational cost 
resulting from the processes to originate and manage loan portfolios may 
increase owing to the use of more sophisticated risk management tools 
that require greater investment in infrastructure (data collection, database 
maintenance and adequate modelling) and human resources. Second, there 
is the cost of risk composed of the cost of capital, which is the opportunity 
cost resulting from the fact that banks need regulatory and risk capital to 
cover loan exposures, and finally the risk premium, which is linked to the 
probability of default of the borrower, the exposure at default and the loss 
given default. The impact of the new banking regulatory rules on these latter 
two costs is not straightforward since it will depend on the risk characteristics 
of the borrowers (see Box 2).
The more risk-sensitive pricing introduced by the new rules through the IRB 
approaches will entail a certain variation in capital adequacy, depending 
ultimately on the individual quality of the borrowers. A poor-quality borrower 
(rated B or CCC) will force its lender to hold more regulatory capital 
compared with a better-quality borrower (rated AAA or AA), but this does 
not ban loan financing.
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As shown in Figure 4, lending to small businesses under the IRB approach would 
reward highly rated businesses by only requiring banks to hold approximately 
2% of capital charges as compared with 8% under the current Basel rules. The 
low-rated firms will cause their lenders to hold more than 8% of capital charges to 
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tax the high risk inherent in this type of business. Under the standardised approach, 
the risk sensitivity of the new rules is lost, which means that a bank is required to 
hold the 8% of capital charges irregardless of the quality of the borrower.
Figure 4a. Capital charges by portfolio and approach: Medium to large corporations
Box 2. What impact does Basel II/CRD have on the cost of credit
to SMEs?
The consumption of the credit institution’s own resources (equity, subordinated debts 
and other reserves) has a direct relationship with the risk incurred by its credit and other 
operations. This is the essence of the risk premium, an important component of the cost 
of credit. Typically, the cost of credit includes:
•   the refinancing cost, which is the price paid by the credit institution to its resource 
providers (the shareholders and other stakeholders);
•  t  he administrative cost, which includes the cost of collecting, processing, analysing 
and evaluating the borrowers’ information, the follow-up and the control of the 
different lines of credit;
•   the cost of the credit institution’s own resources (tier 1 and tier 2), which is the 
opportunity cost requested by the shareholders of the institution;
•   the risk premium, which is the additional cost sought by the credit institution 
from each borrower to cover its expected and unexpected losses; and
•   the credit institution margin, which is the profitability of the bank. 
Basel II/CRD will have an effect on:
•   the administrative cost, owing to the more sophisticated evaluation process of 
credit risk;
•   the cost of the credit institution’s own resources, because of its relationship 
to the consumption of capital, the risk of the portfolio and the higher capital 
requirements; and most importantly,80 What is the likely impact of the CRD on SME financing in Europe?
Figure 4b. Capital charges by portfolio and approach: Small businesses*
and individuals
Source: Ayadi & Resti (2004).
On average, results from the third Quantitative Impact Study of European 
‘group 2’ banks – those that are small and generally less complex and not 
internationally active – showed that no matter which category the SME 
exposure is assigned (to the corporate or the retail portfolio), the new 
regulatory capital rules will yield a lower SME risk weight compared with the 
existing framework (Table 8).
Moreover, as noted earlier, the European Commission report (2004a) on the 
consequences of the Basel II rules for all the sectors of the European economy 
with a particular focus on SMEs concludes that the new Accord should not 
have any negative impact on the availability and cost of finance for SMEs in 
most European countries. It points out that worries about an increase in the 
cost of finance owing to an increased use of internal ratings in lending activity 
are not justified. On the contrary, capital requirements relating to SME credit 
risks are expected to decrease, notably when using IRB approaches.
Other empirical studies
32 undertaken to assess the possible effects of Basel 
II implementation on SMEs in Europe generally find that the new banking 
rules lead to capital requirement savings linked to the SME segment when 
using one of the proposed approaches. When using the standardised approach, 
banks will enjoy more savings when SMEs are considered under the retail 
portfolio (the risk weight goes from 100 to 75%). When using one of the 
IRB approaches, banks are allowed to personalise the capital requirement 
32  See Schwaiger (2002) for the impact of Basel II on Austrian SMEs, Saurina & Trucharte (2004) 
for the impact on Spanish SMEs and Altman & Sabato (2005) for the impact on Italian SMEs. 81 What is the likely impact of the CRD on SME financing in Europe?
calculations and build their own models to estimate PDs when using the 
foundation IRB approach and PDs, LGDs and other parameters when using 
the advanced IRB approach for each client.
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Table 8. Changes in the capital requirements (as compared with the present Accord) 
for ‘group 2’ banks*: Total effect and contributions of individual sub-portfolios
Standardised (%) Foundation IRB (%)
Sovereign 0.03 0.69
Bank 1.30 1.11
Retail (including small businesses) –9.33 –22.46
Corporate –0.74 –3.79
Corporate SMEs –2.23 –4.93
Operational risk 9.41 6.36
Securitisation 0.07 –1.82
Trading portfolio 0.10 0.05
Specialised lending –0.61 1.01
Equity 0.14 1.37
Receivables 0.00 0.00
Investments in related entities 0.64 1.12
Use of general provisions 0.00 –2.57
Total –1.22 –23.86
*Small and generally less complex banks that are not internationally active. 
Source:   European Commission (2003a). Individual data were weighted based on each bank’s relevance 
inside its national system; national data were weighted according to the amount of regulatory 
capital (tier 1 + tier 2 – deductions) present under the current Accord in each of the 15 EU 
member states.
It should be borne in mind, however, that this average reduction does not mask 
a strong variation among banking institutions of different sizes when adopting 
the standardised, foundation or advanced IRB approaches. Furthermore, 
different lending procedures and varying risk management expertise will lead 
to diverse outcomes throughout the banking industry, with better-rated banks 
able to manoeuvre more and lend at better rates. On the whole, it is very 
likely that banks opting for the more-advanced rating approaches would have 
a competitive advantage when lending to SMEs within the retail bracket.
Indeed, these different approaches will certainly generate differences in 
capital requirements for different quality SME portfolios, favouring to some 
extent the large internationally active banks that are more willing to adopt the 
33  See Heitfield (2004) who explains how banks should choose their own rating philosophy. 82 What is the likely impact of the CRD on SME financing in Europe?
advanced IRB approach and thus benefit from a considerable capital discount 
on highly rated SMEs, notably those treated as retail. The high risk-sensitivity 
of the IRB approaches would benefit the investment grade SMEs and penalise 
the riskier ones (say B-rated borrowers and below). The latter will be less 
expensive for banks adopting the standardised approaches; the opposite is 
true for highly rated SMEs.
The existence and the application of sophisticated credit-risk management 
tools will be a key element for banks to qualify for the advanced IRB 
approaches and in turn to ensure better risk-management of their credit 
portfolios, including the exposures to SMEs.
Small- or medium-sized banking institutions that have poorer internal risk-
management systems and are unwilling to install more sophisticated tools will 
have to adopt the standardised approach, which is a fairly improved version of 
the current capital regulatory rules. This does not lead to capital charges for 
the SME portfolio that are different from the current rules (on average the 8% 
capital requirements are kept regardless of the rating of the borrower); but it 
would result in a deterioration of their asset quality since they do not have the 
adequate rating system to isolate and reject high-risk borrowers. The greater 
risk sensitivity introduced when using the foundation IRB implies low capital 
requirements in particular for good quality SMEs and relatively high capital 
requirements for poor quality ones (see Figure 5).
This is not necessarily bad news for SMEs, since a medium-to poor-quality 
borrower is better off asking for a loan from a bank using a standardised 
approach, whereas highly rated SMEs are better off asking for loans from 
IRB banks.
As previously explained, traditionally small and medium-sized banks are 
active locally and are the main supply sources of external finance to SMEs. 
While they have a strong long-term relationship
34 with their clients based 
on local knowledge and experience (which helps to reduce information 
asymmetries), they may profit from their local dominant position by 
extracting ‘rents’ from SMEs, a situation that leads to higher charges. In this 
respect, it is important to monitor and ensure that anti-competitive behaviour 
is kept under the competition authorities’ control.
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Figure 5 Capital charges by approach and portfolio type: The standardised approach 
vs the IRB foundation approach
Source: Ayadi & Resti (2004).
Finally, the higher risk-sensitivity introduced in the new capital adequacy 
regime, while drawing a more precise picture of the creditworthiness of 
borrowers, is likely to raise capital charges in times of economic downturn. 
As a result, capital requirements may become a limitation for granting loans 
to SMEs and others, which in turn could intensify the economic slowdown. 
The pro-cyclical effect of the new Accord arises from the use of risk-sensitive 
techniques in the internal credit-risk systems. These effects are certainly 
different while using the standardised or the IRB approaches.84 What is the likely impact of the CRD on SME financing in Europe?
Indeed, according to a study by the Bank of England,
35 which sought to estimate 
the extent to which banks would downgrade loans in a recession, ratings based 
on Moody’s approach lead to little, if any increase of capital requirements, 
whereas ratings based on a Merton-type model
36 lead to an increase of 40 
to 50%.
37 The strong reactivity of the more sophisticated risk-assessment 
models (such as Merton-type models) is mainly related to the correlation of 
the probabilities of default to the economic cycle. Indeed, the probabilities of 
default are lower when the economic conditions are favourable and higher 
when the economy experiences a downturn. Confirming these conclusions, 
Altman et al. (2002) investigated the link between probabilities of default and 
loss given default and the effects of procyclicality on capital requirements. 
They found that banks that estimate probabilities of default and loss-given 
default had to reduce their credit portfolios to a larger extent, compared with 
banks that only estimate PDs and rely on supervisory estimates of LGDs. This 
finding provides clear evidence that the procyclicality of the Accord is more 
prominent when using the advanced IRB approach.
When the economy is in a downturn, the high risk-sensitivity of Basel II 
may indirectly exacerbate the deterioration of SME financial conditions 
since banks are more likely to cut credit because of the overall deterioration 
of the asset quality. At the same time, the payment behaviour of companies 
is very likely to deteriorate, which typically undermines SMEs’ commercial 
transactions. This would create cash imbalances due to late payments, casting 
additional doubt on SMEs’ creditworthiness and as a consequence would curb 
lending even more. Reduced lending would have a direct negative effect on 
growth, suggesting that some corrective measures should be put in place to 
avoid exacerbating the cycle.
Against this background, when asking bankers whether the new Basel 
Accord would make lending to SMEs less attractive in comparison with large 
companies, a survey by the European Investment Bank (Wagenvoort, 2003c) 
showed that roughly one out of four bankers still finds it difficult to assess the 
possible impact of Basel II on SME lending (see Figure 6).
35  See Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003).
36 A Merton model or structural credit risk model was first proposed by Black and Scholes’ 
and developed by Robert Merton in 1973 in his seminal paper on option pricing, as well as in 
a more detailed paper in 1974. Merton had in fact anticipated the model earlier in 1970. This fact, 
along with his active support of the work of Black and Scholes, is why the model is often referred 
to by his name.
37  Similar results were found in Kashyap and Stein (2003); see also Jordan et al. (2003).85 What is the likely impact of the CRD on SME financing in Europe?
Figure 6. The likely impact of Basel II on firm lending 
Source: Wagenvoort (2003c).
Around 40% of the bankers are of the opinion that lending to medium and 
large firms will remain equally attractive as under current banking regulation. 
With respect to small firms, only 20% of the respondents think that Basel II 
will be neutral for small-firm lending. Among those who expect Basel II to 
have an impact on loans to small firms, about half think that Basel II will 
stimulate lending while the other half anticipates a negative impact. In other 
words, it is expected that there will be banks reducing small-firm lending, but 
this reduction is likely to be offset by other banks that increase it. Recently, 
the McKinsey & Co. survey confirmed that an overwhelming majority of 
banks view the SME credit business as a core element of their portfolio and 
showed their interest in increasing it.
In terms of the practical implications for SME lending, the new IRB approaches 
to managing credit risk imply an increase of work to maintain updated and 
completed databases and to review the ratings and the factors involved in 
the modelling process more often. Indeed, there is a strong expectation that 
IRB banks will require their clients (notably SMEs under corporate and retail 
portfolios) to provide more, better structured, focused and timely data (financial 
statements, business plans, etc.) to complete their systems and to allow them to 
produce a precise and adequate ratings closely aligned to their risk profile over 
time. Covenants will become standard features of loan contracts (in particular 
ratings, leverage and liquidity) especially for long-term credit and the trend 
to collateralised lending as a means to mitigate credit risk will continue. The 
most tangible changes are the use of a more sophisticated statistical design to 
derive the ratings and the way this information is interpreted when using the 86 What is the likely impact of the CRD on SME financing in Europe?
most sophisticated statistical techniques to convert quantitative and qualitative 
data into ratings and probabilities of default, which will enhance the ability to 
identify potential future defaults. These changes will entail a much tighter and 
more systematic monitoring of creditworthiness of the borrower and credit risk 
overall. Yearly rating will be a common standard for banks to help identify 
problem loans. The monitoring process will be based on the data submitted 
yearly by the clients, and any delay in submission will serve as a warning 
signal and most likely lead to a downgrading. These conclusions were 
confirmed by the majority of banks in the McKinsey & Co. survey (European 
Commission, 2005b).
On the one hand, Basel II is a revolution in terms of improving risk 
management through the introduction of more risk-sensitive and more 
sophisticated tools borrowed from modern finance theories. But on the other 
hand, it may create a higher burden for some small enterprises (notably the 
potentially low-rated SMEs), which would need to provide well-structured and 
timely financial statements, to keep their bank accounts in a straight line with 
their agreements, to communicate any change (in the personnel and capital 
employed in the firm and arrange the successor matters), to provide adequate 
guarantees and collateral and to manage their credit function very carefully. 
These enterprises could still overcome the burden by internally managing their 
own risk: first, by investing in the accounting/financial function and ensuring 
they submit accurate and timely information about their financial situation to 
their banks; second, by implementing a viable credit management method that 
could be complemented by credit insurance to monitor their clients’ payment 
behaviour and therefore to avoid bad payment habits or coverage in the event 
of insolvencies. This would in turn lead to a more stable cash flow and hence 
may improve the enterprise’s creditworthiness.
Banks also have the alternative to finance SMEs in the first stages of their 
growth cycle through equity either directly or by investing in private equity or 
venture capital. Under the Basel I Accord, equity positions are risk-weighted 
at 100%, which does not correctly reflect their underlying risk profile. The 
risk weights assigned to these types of exposures, which are considered to 
be high-risk categories, are noticeably higher under the new Basel rules. The 
European Commission’s CRD proposal has introduced lower-risk weights to 
such exposures, as compared with the original text of Basel II, but these are 
still considered to be higher than the current rules.
The new treatment may limit the attractiveness of this type of financing. The 
higher charges imposed on direct-equity financing and bank investments in 87 What is the likely impact of the CRD on SME financing in Europe?
private equity and venture capital business in Europe will inhibit banking 
institutions from investing in such businesses, as they are becoming
very costly.
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Some SMEs, in particular those developing new technologies (‘high-tech’ 
SMEs) and relying to a certain extent on private equity and venture capital 
financing, will be somewhat affected by this treatment.
39 Indeed, developing 
new technologies is considered to be a risky business in addition to the 
uncertainty of expected returns, where the problem of information asymmetry 
is prominent.
6.  Measures to improve SME financing under the new 
rating culture
Banks have been and will continue to be the most important source of 
financing for SMEs in Europe. Today, banks are facing a drastic change in 
the manner they usually conceive their business. Indeed, recent developments 
such as emerging risk-management techniques, financial innovation and other 
drivers linked to the high expectations of shareholders and regulators have 
brought new challenges for banks. Hence, they need to run their business 
with the most accurate tools not only to meet expectations but also to position 
themselves against fierce competition. In practice, banks must manage the 
risks to which they are exposed very carefully, with a specific focus on credit 
risk stemming from counterparties of varying risk quality. The SME sector 
is clearly one in which banks are looking to expand – first because SMEs 
have a high potential for innovation and flexibility and second because they 
foster growth. In parallel, the European Commission is committed to creating 
the best possible environment for SMEs to grow and to contribute to the 
realisation of the EU’s Lisbon Agenda of March 2000. 
38 The role of banks in developing the European private equity and venture capital market is 
essential as banks contribute 25% of all capital committed (EVCA, 2004). 
39 According to a survey of European venture capital conducted by Bottazzi et al. (2004), 
almost 1,300 European firms were financed by European venture capitalists. These firms mainly 
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The new requirements introduced by Basel II in parallel with the CRD mirror 
the trend in the financial industry towards more scientific risk-measurement 
and management. Since managing risks is the core of business of financial 
institutions, they ought to do it in the best possible way. Hence, the new 
regulation creates higher incentives for banks to assess the risk inherent in 
each individual exposure: riskier lending will be more expensive while safer 
lending will be less costly. In other words, for the banks that choose the IRB 
methods, there will be no room for cross-subsidisation. For these types of 
banks, credit decisions will be based on the individual risk quality of each 
borrower and his or her capacity to repay debt over time.
For SMEs, this will mean that their rating and probability of default are 
the determinant components for credit decisions (acceptance, rejection and 
conditions). They are also going to have a wider range of choices in terms 
of price and credit conditions. Since SMEs will not necessarily be aware of 
these changes, it is important that banks inform them. SMEs will also need to 
expend greater efforts and cooperate in a constructive way.
At the same time, the public sector should take action in terms of improving 
the general framework conditions of finance. Together with the markets, the 
public sector should act as a catalyst to encourage development.
The role of banks
As previously shown, gaps in information between borrowers and lenders are 
among the root causes of financing constraints for SMEs. The establishment 
of a long-term relationship based on increased transparency is key to reducing 
these information asymmetries.
40 The new banking regulations also cite 
increased transparency as a precondition for an effective cooperation between 
lenders and SMEs.
Banks should not hesitate to play their role by informing their customers 
about the changes and showing them how ratings impact their credit terms. 
Communication should not be limited to the reasons for not granting bank 
loans or withdrawing existing credit lines – it should be built upon mutual trust 
between banks and SMEs. Indeed, since ratings and associated probabilities 
of default are becoming the main factor for deciding whether or not a bank 
assigns or extends a line of credit, SMEs will need to be informed.
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Therefore, bank procedures – including individual ratings, risk assessment 
and the factors leading to downgrading – will need to be more transparent 
to SMEs. In our interviews conducted with banks (for the purpose of this 
work), they were asked about their plans to disclose the rating process and 
individual ratings to their clients. Only a minority intend to disclose the 
individual ratings voluntarily. The majority plan to inform customers about 
the main drivers of the rating decision to enable them to address the necessary 
levers leading to an improved rating and to mitigate credit risk.
41 Obviously, 
a variety of views emanated from these interviews.
Against these different views, it is advisable to define minimum criteria on 
the level of the transparency required, which is not prejudicial to banks in 
terms of cost increases or competitiveness. Disclosing and explaining the 
overall detailed ratings process to potential clients could overburden a bank 
as it implies mobilising extra human resources. If the potential client becomes 
a loyal customer, the additional costs incurred by the bank may be passed on 
as service costs to the customer. If the potential client is no longer interested 
or is shopping around to obtain the best ratings, then these costs will be 
a complete loss. Building on this point, it is crucial to define the right amount 
of disclosure that is both acceptable by banks and helpful to SMEs.
To explore this recommendation, our survey asked banks how they perceive 
an explicit regulation of ratings disclosure to loan applicants. The striking 
majority of respondents were not in favour of such a move since they think 
this would entail an extra regulatory burden.
42 In this respect, they consider 
that a non-legislative code of conduct between banks and SMEs should 
suffice to establish a framework that sets out principles on the disclosure of 
ratings and rating processes for banking and SME associations.
We strongly believe that a better disclosure of rating processes by banks will 
improve the new rating culture and also the SME–bank relationship in the 
rating process. It is therefore important to adequately define the principles 
that are the minimum requirements for governing this relationship. For 
example, before the rating process, banks need to inform SMEs about:
41 These conclusions were confirmed by the McKinsey & Co. survey (see European 
Commission 2005b).
42 The adopted CRD stipulates that “banks are called upon to disclose their ratings decisions 
in writing and comprehensibly to SMEs and other corporate applicants for loans. Should 
a voluntarily undertaking by the sector in this regard prove inadequate, national legislative 
measures shall be adopted. The administrative costs for the banks have to be at an appropriate 
rate to the size of the loan” (emphasis added). 90 Measures to improve SME financing under the new rating culture
1)    the data needed to determine the rating;
2)    the factors affecting the credit decision (collateral, external ratings, etc.); 
3)    the principles of the rating system that will be applied (i.e. those covering 
the retail versus corporate categories); and 
4)   possible ways to improve the rating (better credit management, further 
guarantees, a more defined business plan, etc.).
After the rating process, banks need to communicate and explain the credit 
decision (acceptance, rejection or likely change of loan conditions) in a clear, 
comprehensible written manner. When updating the ratings (generally on an 
annual basis), banks need to inform their clients well in advance to provide 
the necessary inputs and again provide a written, comprehensible explanation 
of the changes.
The role of SMEs 
Adopting one of the IRB approaches under the new banking regulation means 
that banks have to rely extensively on quantitative and qualitative information 
provided by SMEs. This information is essential for running the internal rating 
system properly. Companies that are well managed, adequately leveraged 
(equity ratio) and that provide timely, relevant and precise information 
will be in a position to obtain a better rating and consequently better credit 
conditions. Hence, it is crucial that companies understand and accommodate 
the new capital requirements in order to provide the most relevant data 
needed by lenders to rate their risk exposures. Below are the practical actions 
that SMEs must take to improve their ratings.
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General steps 
1)    Study and understand the bank requirements for granting a loan. Financial 
advice could be seen as an additional solution to make sure all the elements 
are taken into consideration.
2)    Deliver clear, complete and timely financial and performance data needed 
by lenders to assign yearly ratings for granting a new loan or extending an 
existing line of credit with better conditions. Indeed, delayed submission 
of financial and performance data is seen to be a warning signal in many 
banks’ internal rating systems. It usually leads to a downgrading and 
therefore price increases in new loan offers or the refusal of new loans.
43  For more details, see the European Commission’s (2005c) practical guide to loan financing 
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Practical actions
3)   Improve the factors that are considered to be important in the rating 
process, specifically: 
•   Make sure that cash-flow stabilisation and generation receive priority among 
these efforts, since it is often the key tangible signal with which SMEs can 
negotiate their creditworthiness. This could be done by increasing and 
diversifying the sources of revenues (products and services), the customer 
and supplier’s base and distribution channels, and implementing viable 
internal or external credit-management procedures to monitor clients’ 
payment behaviour (receivables) and therefore avoid bad payment habits. 
Late payment habits from clients should be limited since the late or irregular 
cashing-in of revenues could easily drag down the rating and, by limiting 
the perceived debt capacity of the firm, may adversely affect company 
growth. In addition to legislative efforts to combat such malpractices 
(e.g. the EU’s late payment directive), many companies could directly 
take action by (for example) using credit insurance policies to prevent 
and minimise late payments and defaults. Credit insurance could offer 
a complete risk-management tool that helps management to put in place 
the necessary procedures to continuously monitor the creditworthiness of 
clients and reduce the risk of delays and defaults.
•   Increase the equity base by preferring retained earnings over distributed 
profits.
•   Improve the accounting, controlling and management methods within 
the company where these need attention. Entrepreneurs should not only 
give more importance to the accounting and financial functions within 
the company but also move towards more active balance-sheet (or asset 
liability) management in terms of reducing the mismatch between long-term 
commitment versus cash. SMEs should also consider how they manage 
their liabilities as a means to increase competitiveness. In this respect, 
innovation could serve them very well – as it has served banks – to reduce 
the overall amount of risk through the active management of liabilities.
•   Consolidate the business development strategy, encourage strategic 
thinking among managers in terms of the business prospects, undertake 
market/sector/activity analyses and improve external communications with 
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•   Renew the attention given to some aspects of the business that may have 
been neglected, such as keeping bank accounts in line with agreements, 
communicating any changes in the personnel or capital employed in the 
firm, and determining successor arrangements for key staff.
•   Put in place recovery procedures in the event of crisis scenarios such as the 
loss of a key person in the company, the revaluation of a national currency 
for companies that heavily rely on exports, etc.
4)   Ensure that adequate guarantees and collateral are provided. Collateral 
and guarantees help to obtain better loan conditions. As previously noted, 
the loan pricing policy is mainly influenced by rating, term structure 
(maturity) and collateral. SMEs need to be able to provide adequate 
collateral. The list of credit-risk mitigation techniques in Basel II and the 
CRD is extensive, but these ultimately depend on the expected recovery 
rate (which is a related variable of the LGD). For example, the expected 
recovery rate of cash is almost 100%, while the expected recovery rate for 
receivables is between 60 and 95%. It is advisable for SMEs to look at 
other types of collateral such as credit insurance, which again could offer 
an indemnification for accounts receivable to increase their value when 
recovery is required in the case of default. Credit insurance could also 
serve as a protection for SMEs in countries with high political risks.
Other specific actions
5)   Work more proactively to increase equity finance. Many SMEs need 
stronger balance sheets. Venture capital, equity finance and business 
angels are more readily accessible to SMEs that can show high growth 
potential.
6)   Consider different financing sources. Although it is true that the main 
financing products are provided by banks, it is important for SMEs to 
be able to compare different financing sources to judge which is more 
appropriate to the risk level of the company according to its growth cycle. 
Leasing, factoring and other sources could offer a good response to SMEs 
willing to investigate other financing means, particularly for those that 
have more difficulties providing well-structured financial and performance 
data – the basic prerequisites to accessing finance through banks.93 Measures to improve SME financing under the new rating culture
The role of public policy 
Improving access to finance is an important aspect of fostering entrepreneurship 
and growth in Europe. Many actions have been already been taken at the 
European and national levels to improve access to finance. The purpose of this 
section is not to enumerate these actions but to suggest some improvements to 
enhance the environment for SME financing in the post-Basel II/CRD era.
1)   There is room for continued improvement in the relationship between 
banks and SMEs in the new rating culture. Thus it is important to establish 
a non-legislative framework (code of conduct) that sets out the principles 
for defining minimum criteria for ratings disclosure.
2)   Access to equity finance could also be improved. As equity finance is 
included in the high-risk category under Basel II and the CRD, banks 
are likely to withdraw from these investments owing to the high risk 
weights assigned to them. At the same time, many SMEs need stronger 
balance sheets that can be translated into a higher equity ratio. Hence, 
at the regional, national and European levels, it is important to focus on 
developing European venture capital markets and their liquidity, and to 
promote the possibilities provided by business angels and their networks. 
3)    Since a stronger equity base is a reflection of higher creditworthiness, it is 
important to recognise that retained earnings are the best form of financing 
growth and investment. National governments should review whether 
their tax laws obstruct firm growth by taxing retained earnings more than 
distributed profits.
4)   Legislative efforts to combat late payment habits need to continue and 
be reinforced to ensure better stabilisation of cash flows, which are 
a prerequisite for better ratings.94
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Abstract
Rating models used by banks to evaluate the creditworthiness of SME clients 
still differ substantially with regard to the underlying rating philosophy, system 
architecture and calibration. Looking at bank ratings from an SME perspective 
as a current or potential future borrower, the question arises as to whether the 
different designs of bank internal rating models lead to different rating results 
and subsequently to different credit conditions. This problem is the basis of 
the research question at the heart of this article. In our empirical study, we 
rate a representative sample of Swiss SME clients by different rating models. 
We first test whether different rating models belonging to different types of 
modeling architectures lead to different risk classifications (rating results), even 
though identical input data is used. This first hypothesis can be supported based 
1 A later version of this conference paper was published in German in the "Zeitschrift für 
Betriebswirtschaft (ZfB), 78. Jg. (2008), H.10" as "KMU-Ratingmodelle und Ratingqualität: 
Auswirkungen der Ratingarchitektur auf die ex-ante Risikoklassifikation von KMU-
Kreditkontrakten"
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on our empirical findings and may implicate the risk of rating model arbitrage 
against banks. The second hypothesis tested is based on empirical findings 
from other studies, analyzing whether the inclusion of qualitative information 
leads to significantly higher rating marks compared to ratings solely based on 
quantitative information. Our findings do not support the second assumption.
1. Introduction
A bank’s decision to grant a loan and the according credit conditions 
(risk-adjusted prices, volume, tenor, collateral) to an SME are of significant 
importance for single debtors and also for the economy as a whole. The 
efficiency and quality of the credit rating and selection process at banks 
influence both the credit supply of the economy and long-term provisioning 
rates, thereby affecting the profitability of banks and the stability of the entire 
financial system.
With the implementation of the New Capital Accord in 2007, the discussion 
of bank internal rating models has increased both in academia and practice. 
The BIS paper specifies conceptual requirements for internal rating systems 
that need to be matched, so that an internal rating system can be accepted by 
supervisors (Basle Committee (2006)). However, there is a substantial degree 
of freedom left within these guidelines. Consequently, rating models used by 
banks still differ substantially with regard to the underlying rating philosophy, 
system architecture and calibration.
Looking at bank ratings from an SME perspective as a current or potential 
future borrower, the question arises as to whether the different designs of 
bank internal rating models lead to different rating results and therefore 
to different credit conditions, even though input data remains unchanged. 
Besides the impact for SMEs, “flawed” rating decisions might also lead to the 
mispricing of SME loans, which could result in adverse selection effects and 
a loss of market share for the respective banks.
The rating model’s design is determined by the underlying rating philosophy. 
The rating philosophy itself is again determined by the purpose of the rating, 
the rating object and time dimensions. In the context of SME loans, the purpose 103 Introduction
of the rating for the individual loan exposure is usually the determination of 
probabilities of default (PD). PDs can be used as a tool to control the risk 
exposure in a SME portfolio and as a basis for economic applications such 
as pricing and economic capital attribution (Nakamura/Roszbach (2005)). 
Usually, companies are defined as rating objects, i.e. a counterparty rating is 
applied (in contrast to transaction ratings). With regard to the time dimension, 
banks differentiate between “through-the-cycle” ratings and “point-in-time” 
ratings, whereas empirical studies show that the latter is more important in 
banking practice (Amato/Furfine (2004)). The analyses presented in this 
article therefore focus on “point-in-time” counterparty rating models for 
SMEs, which attribute a certain PD to a borrower.
Following the definition in the Basle paper, a rating system covers all 
methods, processes, controls, data and IT systems that are necessary to 
calibrate rating models and derive PD estimates (Basle Committee (2006)). 
In this article, we use the term rating model as being a part of the overall 
rating system. A rating model is used to perform risk classifications in terms 
of ratings. The architecture of a rating model describes the elements of the 
model and their relationships with each other.
Typically, a PD is attributed to a specific rating class. Therefore, a rating 
describes the ex-ante quantification of the risk, that the rating object does 
not perform with regard to predefined credit events, typically paying back 
the liabilities within a certain time frame. In practice, the attributed PDs are 
often used as a basis for loan decisions and the application of risk premiums 
and credit limits.
The article is organized as follows: Based on a literature overview, we 
develop two hypotheses as a framework for our empirical analysis. This 
is followed by the empirical analysis in section 3, where we rate a credit 
portfolio of 435 counterparties using three different real rating models with 
different architectures. We test these two hypotheses with regard to the impact 
of different rating model architectures on risk classification and discuss the 
results in section 4. In the two concluding sections, we interpret the results 
and develop a conclusion and potential impacts.104
2.  Contribution to literature
Even though external rating models of the dominant rating agencies have 
been analyzed in various articles dealing with different research questions 
(Cantor/Packer (1997), Poon (2003), Löffler (2004)), there are only limited 
empirical studies dealing with the impact of internal rating models on the 
ex-ante risk classification of loans.
In the literature, typically three types of rating models are differentiated 
between based on the respective information processing design (not on the 
underlying data). In qualitative models, experts perform rather subjective 
classifications within predefined categories, whereas the underlying data 
can be both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative models are based on 
standardized and objective mathematical and statistical procedures. Models 
using qualitative and quantitative procedures simultaneously or iteratively 
are called hybrids. However, only the type of information processing – not 
the underlying data – determines the type of the rating model (Füser (2001); 
Oelerich (2004); Eigermann (2002)).
Internationally, the architecture of rating models seems to follow shared 
principles, even though a standard is missing. In a detailed discussion paper 
of the “Models Task Force” of the Basle Committee, an empirical analysis 
and classification of internal rating models of banks was performed (Basle 
Committee (2000a) and (2000b)). The analysis concludes there is no common 
standard for design and application of internal rating models yet. However, 
there are several common factors to be seen, among which are the choice of 
the risk indicators, the prioritization of counterparty rating before transaction 
rating and specific aspects of structures of rating processes.
Krahnen/Weber (2001) developed thirteen principles, which can be interpreted 
as quality standards for the development of internal rating models in banks. 
Among these are general requirements like adequate comprehensiveness 
and completeness as well as adequate complexity. Others requirements are 
model-specific e.g. detailed specification of credit events, monotonicity in the 
relation between ratings and PDs and the necessity of adequate granularity of 
the rating classes to avoid adverse selection. Similar arguments can be found 
in the consultative paper of the Basle Committee, which defines requirements 
for a rating model to be certified by the national supervisory committees 
(Basle Committee (2006)).105 Contribution to literature
Papers by Treacy/Carey (2000) and English/Nelson (1998) describe and 
analyze internal rating models of large US banks. Treacy/Carey not only prove 
the different architecture of bank internal rating systems, they also indicate 
various problems that could occur from inconsistent system architectures with 
regard to rating. Similar studies were done for Swedish Banks and presented 
by Jacobson/Linde/Roszbach (2003) and Nakamura/Roszbach (2005).
An empirical study by Brunner/Krahnen/Weber (2000) deals with bank 
internal ratings in Germany. It focuses on the question of whether banks can 
use the information advantage obtained by the rating process in competitive 
lending markets. To do so, the impact of non-public information (qualitative 
factors) on the overall rating result was analyzed. The paper concludes that 
qualitative information tends to improve companies’ overall corporate rating. 
This analysis is different to our approach, as data was taken from 3 different 
German banks which were asked to select a random sample of 200 clients 
from their respective portfolio and rate those clients with their own rating 
systems. Therefore, the samples used were independent as the borrowers were 
different in any case.
Other empirical studies by Hornik et al. (2005) were based on a data sample 
coming from the Austrian National Bank with partially overlapping client 
samples from 27 Austrian banks. The authors develop an approach to use 
multi-rater information to validate rating models for specific situations, where 
no historical loss data is available. Again, this study differs from our analysis, 
as only partially overlapping and not totally consistent input data was used.106
3.  Impact of different rating architectures
In balance sheet oriented banking systems (e.g. Switzerland), banks are 
the most important source of capital for SMEs. Banks’ credit processes 
differ substantially with regard to their selection criteria and the according 
risk-adjusted assessments. Looking at this practice reveals that SMEs with 
more than one banking relationship receive different loan conditions from the 
different banks, even though the input parameters are the same. Therefore, 
different ratings as a result of different models have an impact on pricing, as 
well as on the competitive advantage of the bank due to e.g. adverse selection 
effects and margin erosion.
If different architectures of SME rating models can lead to different risk 
classifications, it is important to know exactly how the rating is influenced 
by the model architecture particularly as the rating architecture itself often 
remains a black box to the borrower. Therefore, the aim of the empirical study 
is to rate a representative sample of Swiss SMEs by using different rating 
models and test whether different rating models belonging to alternate types 
of model architectures lead to varied risk classification (rating results) even 
though identical input data is used. We test this Hypothesis H1 in section 4.1.
Impact of qualitative and quantitative criteria
As discussed, rating models can be based on quantitative or qualitative 
criteria or on a combination of both. Based on Hypothesis H1, it is important 
to analyze the impact of the application of qualitative or quantitative criteria 
and to observe how this influences the risk classification, even though 
identical input data is used.
Empirical studies suggest that rating models with higher measurements/
weighting of qualitative criteria lead to better rating classification in terms of 
lower risk. In their comparative study of the rating models of three German 
banks, Brunner/Krahnen/Weber show that qualitative criteria are rated 
significantly higher than quantitative criteria and that they show less variance 
across risk classes (Brunner/Krahnen/Weber (2000)). The analysis is different 
from ours as data from the three banks’ own portfolios was used as input for 
the respective rating model (randomly chosen). The analysis was based on 
a rating scale with four classes only, so it cannot be adequately concluded 
whether the application of scales with finer granularity (as is common 107 Impact of different rating architectures
practice now and also a Basle II requirement) would lead to comparable 
results. Another study by Weber/Krahnen/Vossmann showed that not only 
are qualitative ratings systematically higher than quantitative ratings for the 
same borrower, but also that over time, qualitative ratings fluctuate less than 
quantitative ones. (Weber, Krahnen, Vossmann (1999)).
In Section 3.2., we test the Hypothesis H2 that risk classification by using 
qualitative criteria leads to significantly higher classifications compared to 
analysis based on quantitative criteria only.
Empirical Analysis
Based on the discussion in the above sections, the following hypotheses are 
tested:
•   H1: Different rating architectures lead to significantly different rating 
results for an identical borrower.
•   H2: The inclusion of qualitative information leads to significantly better 
ratings compared to ratings solely based on quantitative information.
Characteristics of rating models used
When analyzing Swiss banking practice it becomes obvious that mainly 
quantitative or statistical models are used, which are based both on qualitative 
and quantitative data (hybrid). Accordingly, we used three real statistical 
rating models in our analyses, which are representative for the types of 
models used in banking practice. The first model used is solely based on 
quantitative data from public information such as balance sheets and earnings 
statements of the companies. This model is an extreme version of statistical 
models used, as it does not include qualitative data at all. The other two 
models can be differentiated with reference to their usage of quantitative and 
qualitative data.
The models used are point-in-time ratings with a time horizon of 1 year (for 
details see e.g. Rösch (2005)). All models are based on a scoring process: 
a criterion is given a score by means of a determined transformation function 
{vi}. Consequently, based on an aggregation rule, the individual criterion 
is weighted by a factor ki. Finally, the results are aggregated following an 
algebraic rule. The final score determines the application of a rating class 
(Brunner/Krahnen/Weber (2000); Altman (2000); Hastie/Tibshirani (1990)):108 Impact of different rating architectures
v(a)=Σi ki vi (ai) (1)
Even though the elements of the architecture in these three models are 
comparable, they are different with regard to the selection criteria used, the 
transformation to scores and the weights applied. All three models are used 
in banking practice.
•   Model 1 constitutes a typical rating model of a bank and is used for risk 
assessments of non-listed SMEs. It is based on seven financial ratios 
(quantitative factors covering e.g. liquidity, leverage, profitability, revenue) 
and eleven qualitative criteria. The application of weights for the criteria 
is performed by a statistical approach: First a selection of criteria is 
performed separately for qualitative and quantitative criteria based on an 
univariate analysis and results of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
– a measure for the discriminatory power of a criterion (Stein (2005); 
Blochwitz et al. (2004)). Finally, an iterative multivariate analysis is used 
(logit model) to find the best combination of the pre-selected criteria. Both 
ratings (qualitative and quantitative) deliver a score, which is now weighted 
by an additional logit model, whereas qualitative criteria are given a weight 
of approximately 30%. PDs are estimated and attributed to rating classes 
based on the historical data of the bank. The rating scale consists of ten 
classes for performing assets.
•   Model 2 is also a hybrid model. It is, however, different to model 1 with 
regard to model development, criteria used, architecture and calibration. 
The criteria were chosen because of their discriminatory power and 
ability to be communicated to users. The model consists of one part that 
is based on quantitative criteria and another one that rather constitutes an 
expert system. The latter allows the differentiation between borrowers in 
the higher classes of the rating system based on qualitative criteria. The 
transformation of the seven quantitative criteria into a score is based on 
logistic transformation functions. Together with two additional quantifiable 
criteria, the transformed requirements are combined based on multivariate 
optimization. The expert system covers seven qualitative factors, combining 
them to an expert score. The combination of qualitative and quantitative 
results works as follows: First a base rating is determined, based on 
quantitative criterion. This base rating determines the impact of the expert 
score. At the lower range of the rating scale, qualitative factors do not have 
an impact on the final rating (weight = 0%). The higher the base rating, the 
larger the influence of the expert system, whereas the maximum weight of 
the latter is 30%. The model uses ten rating classes for performing assets. 109 Impact of different rating architectures
However, the best two cannot be reached by an SME. If the base rating is 
in class 8 to 10, no correction by the expert model applies. The best base 
classification is rating class 5 and the then applied expert rating can adjust 
the final rating to range between rating class 7 and 3.
•   Model 3 is based on quantitative criteria only and qualitative criteria are 
not used. However, industry information is used for the application of 
default expectations per industry. The quantitative ratios cover profitability, 
leverage, debt coverage, growth, liquidity, activity ratios and size of the 
company. The model design reflects the fact that the relationship between 
a financial ratio and the PD is usually non-linear and not always monotone. 
At the same time, user transparency was considered when selecting 
the respective ratios. The model is based on a two-step function with 
non-parametric transformation and belongs to the class of Generalized 
Additive Models (see also Hastie/Tibshirani (1990)).
Data
We use the three rating models to rate a real credit portfolio from a commercial 
bank in Switzerland consisting of 435 representative Swiss SMEs from one 
region, well diversified across industries, age of the company and size 
(revenues between CHF 1.5m and CHF 100m). For each counterparty 
a real-life dataset of quantitative (as taken from balance sheet and income 
statements) and qualitative (non-public information as gathered by the 
respective credit officer) data from several consecutive years was available. 
Therefore, all counterparties could be rated with all three rating systems at 
a certain point in time between May 2005 and June 2006.
Figure 1 shows the exposure distribution in the credit portfolio in terms of 
revenue. The distribution can be considered as representative for a Swiss 
SME portfolio.110 Impact of different rating architectures
Figure 1: Exposure Distribution 
The companies in the portfolio are well diversified in terms of age of the 
company, as there are start-ups with age <1 year at the one end and companies 
operating for 136 years at the other end of the scale (average of 22.52 years). 
Figure 2 shows the industry distribution (real estate not considered):
Figure 2: Industry Distribution 
The focus on one region does not have an impact on industry distribution 
or risk classification. 111 Impact of different rating architectures
Methodological approach
For all companies in the dataset, risk classifications are generated by using all 
three models at identical rating dates. First, all classifications are done using 
model 1 and classifications noted as ‘impaired’ are removed from the dataset, 
due to different default definitions. Quantitative data was adjusted so that it 
matches the respective data requirements of the rating tool to calculate the 
required ratios. Qualitative data was sufficient for the valuation with model 
1 and 2; only a mapping of the respective scales was necessary. Model 3 does 
not require qualitative data, but uses balance sheet information from previous 
years.
The various rating models result in 1-year PDs calibrated for the respective 
rating classes. We mapped the original PDs on the official Moody’s rating 
scale, so that rating results of different models could be compared. If a PD 
falls on a boundary of the Moody’s PD bands, the lower rating class was 
mapped.
4. Empirical  Results
4.1. H1: Different rating architectures lead to significantly different 
rating results for an identical borrower.
In order to test Hypothesis H1 we compare the rating results of the three 
different models. By doing so, we use the corresponding ordinal classifications 
of Moody’s rating scale and map the original PDs on this scale. Since our 
analysis shows additional insight gained by using the original PDs is marginal 
and presentability of the results becomes far more complex, we do not use 
the original PDs. The loss of information experienced through the mapping 
on a joint scale is small and therefore does not influence the interpretation of 
the empirical analysis.
We begin our tests on the basis of descriptive statistics. This test section 
is followed by formal robustness checks (correlation / similarity test 
by Bravais-Pearson/Spearman, identical distribution test based on 112 Empirical Results
Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test). Figure 3 shows the rating distribution of the three 
models for our sample of 435 corporates.
Figure 3: Histogram Rating Distribution
A comparison of the distributions of the rating scales shows a substantially 
different result for the three models. Models 1 and 3 incorporate an 
equally-weighted distribution of the ratings over the different rating classes. 
By contrast, Model 2 contains a strong concentration in the rating classes of 
Ba1 or lower.
Figure 4: Cumulative Frequency Distribution113 Empirical Results
Figure 4 leads to the assumption that the three cumulative distribution functions 
are correlated. Following Bravais-Pearson (under the assumption that the data 
of more than 400 observations is metric) and Spearman (non-parametric), this 
assumption is tested by calculating the relevant correlation. In both cases, the 
correlations are well within the 0.01-quantile.
Furthermore, Figure 4 predicts that the empirical results of Model 3 do not 
originate from the same distribution as the results of Models 1 and 3. The 
outcomes of Models 1 and model 2 stay constantly below those of Model 3 
(except the distribution tails). In addition, the outcomes of Models 1 and 2 
are changing with lower rating classes: Model 1’s figures increase rapidly for 
high rating classes, but starting at Ba1 the slope slows and Model 2’s outcome 
simultaneously increases significantly. This shows that Model 2 incorporates 
higher cumulative frequencies for the rating classes at the lower end.
In order to derive statistical significant evidence for the distribution of the 
three rating outcomes, we compare the data basis pairwise by performing 
a Wilcoxon rank-sum-test (WRS-test). This test is a non-parametric statistical 
test, which can be applied to dependent samples like ours. We test our 
null hypothesis, which states that the two samples descend from the same, 
unknown distribution. Our results show that the null hypothesis can be indeed 
rejected in all three pairwise comparisons on an 0.01 level. The distributions 
of the rating outcomes of the three models do not descend from the same 
distribution, even if they are positively correlated.
4.2. H2: Inclusion of qualitative information leads to significantly 
better ratings compared to ratings solely based on quantitative 
information.
To test Hypothesis H2 we use pairwise comparisons of the three models. First, 
we evaluate the match of outcomes in each rating class. Second, by comparing 
the rating of one model for a specific SME with the rating of a second model 
for the same SME, we display the number of discrepancies for each rating 
class. If we link these discrepancies to the different characteristics of the 
rating models, we can evaluate the impact of qualitative and quantitative 
factors on the rating classification. For reasons of clarity, only rating classes 
are included for which at least one rating exists in either model. Therefore, the 
following tables of the pairwise comparisons incorporate a varying number 
of rating classes.114 Empirical Results
4.3. Comparison Model 1 vs. Model 2
A comparison of the rating outcomes of Models 1 and 2 is summarized in the 
following table:
Table 1: Comparison Model 1 / Model 2
  Model 1              
Model 2 Aa2 Aa3 A1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa  
Aa2   0
Aa3  1 7 8
A1  0
Baa2 1 17 10 11 3 4 3 1 50
Baa3  0
Ba1 2 18 39 29 14 15 7 11 7 3 145
Ba2 3 8 12 6 5 14 7 13 5 73
Ba3 3 1 4 4 5 11 6 12 6 52
B1 1 4 4 6 4 8  5 14 18 64
B 2 3 217 2492 8
B3  0
Caa        1   2  1 8 3 15
 3 0 42 62 65 35 34 56 0 35 58 45 435
As shown in Section 2.1, the two models differ mainly in the way they 
integrate or attribute weights of the qualitative factors. The comparison of 
the bank-specific approach of Model 1 with the far more complex criteria 
approach of Model 2 shows that “higher” rating outcomes of Model 1 (rating 
classes Aa2–Ba1) are almost always rated “lower” in Model 2. At the same 
time, the “lower” rated SMEs of Model 1 (rating classes Ba2–Caa) are 
predominately rated “higher” in Model 2. Conversely, corporates rated by 
Model 2 with a rating in the upper half of the rating scale are rated slightly 
higher by Model 1, whereas the ratings of the lower half of the rating scale 
(as attributed by Model 2) are rated marginally lower: 
In case of low classifications in the quantitative rating section, the impact of 
qualitative factors decreases accordingly in Model 2 (see section 4.2). Indeed, 
for the lowest rating classes, only quantitative factors are incorporated in the 
risk classification. Model 1 on the other hand does not change the weight of 
the qualitative factors and leaves them at the same level for all rating classes. 
Apparently, the lower weights of quantitative factors in case of low rating 
classes do not result in the expected lower rating classification in comparison 115 Empirical Results
to Model 1. Therefore, on the basis of the comparison performed between 
Model 1 and Model 2, Hypothesis H2 cannot be confirmed.
Table 2: Summary Comparison Model 1 / Model 2
Assessment by Model 1 Assessment by Model 2
by Model 2
1













nd half of 
rating scale 
(Ba2–Caa)
higher 15 171 higher 135 69
lower 168 36 lower 112 74
equal 24 21 equal 24 21
4.4. Comparison Model 1 vs. Model 3
A comparison of the hybrid Model 1 with Model 3, which in contrast is 
exclusively based on quantitative data input, leads to a quite similar picture 
as already seen in Table 1.
Table 3: Comparison Model 1 / Model 3
  Model 1                      
Model 3 Aa1 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa  
Aa1    0
Aa3 19 2  1 2
A1 17  2 1 1   1 2
A2 4  741 1   1 7
A3 1 5  252 1 5 1   2 2
Baa1 41 5 1 4 7 1 3 1  4 5
Baa2 61 1 1 2 3 4 4 3  4 3
Baa3 51 8 1 0 7 9 6 4 2  6 1
Ba1 1 3 10 5 8 11 5 6 4  53
Ba2 158 7 1 3 1 0 1 5 4  6 3
Ba3 152 2 7  9 1 1 6  4 3
B1 4  11 12   27
B2 11 6 5  1 3
B3 5 135 1 4
Caa                 1  2 7 1 0
  3 42 0 0 0 62 65 35 34 56 0 35 58 45 0 435116 Empirical Results
The quite positively rated corporates in Model 1 (Aa1–Baa3) predominantly 
receive lower rating classifications in the quantitative focused approach 
of Model 3. Model 3 in contrast allocates Model 1’s rating classifications 
of the lower half of the rating scale significantly better. A similar picture 
is derived from Model 3’s perspective: Estimations of Model 3 tend to be 
adjusted downwards by Model 1. This means that corporate entities receive 
comparably ”lower” ratings in Model 1 throughout the entire rating scale 
than attributed by Model 3. This result in turn contradicts Hypothesis H2, 
which states that the inclusion of qualitative information leads to a higher 
creditworthiness (rating class) in comparison to the rating outcome solely 
based on quantitative information.
Table 4: Summary Comparison Model 1 / Model 3
Assessment by Model 1 Assessment by Model 3
by Model 3
1













nd half of 
rating scale 
(Ba1–Caa)
higher 49 156 higher 72 83
lower 115 40 lower 96 109
equal 43 32 equal 43 32
4.5. Comparison Model 2/Model 3
Finally, the third comparison of our sample portfolio rests upon the results 
of Model 2 and Model 3. In the course of this analysis, we compare a hybrid 
model, which varies in the qualitative factor weights over the different rating 
classes (Model 2) with a solely quantitative focused model (Model 3).
Again, the results show a complete different picture as assumed under 
Hypothesis H2. Despite the inclusion of qualitative factors (up to rating class 
Baa2), Model 2 generates a significantly lower rating than in Model 3 over 
almost all rating classes. Only the lower ratings starting at Ba3 seem to confirm 
Hypothesis H2. But we have to acknowledge that particularly in these rating 
classes and also in Model 2, the impact of the qualitative factors leans towards 
zero. On the basis of this argument, we have to reject Hypothesis H2.117 Empirical Results
Table 5: Comparison Model 2 / Model 3
  Model 2                    
Model 3 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa  
Aa3  38 1   1 2
A1 1 4 5 2   1 2
A2  51 0 2   1 7
A3 4 7 8 3   2 2
Baa1  11 29 4   44
Baa2 10 20 8 2 2 1 43
Baa3 1 5  31 16 4 3 2  62
Ba1 21 3 1 0 1 0 1 3 3 2 5 3
Ba2 31 7 1 2 1 2 1 3 4 2 6 3
Ba3 2 4 11 12 8 5 1 43
B1 5 5 12 3 2 27
B2 56 1 11 3
B3 13 7  31 4
Caa                  4 3   3 1 0
  8 0 0 0 0 50 0 145 73 52 64 28 0 15 435
Table 6: Summary Comparison Model 2 / Model 3
Assessment by Model 2 Assessment by Model 3
by Model 3
1













nd half of 
rating scale 
(Ba1–Caa)
higher 30 253 higher 11 78
lower 18 71 lower 191 92
equal 10 53 equal 10 53118
5.  Interpretation and Conclusion
1)    The risk classification depends on the architecture of the rating model. The 
comparison of the results of the three rating models shows a surprisingly 
high number of deviations in risk classification, even though data input 
was identical. Not even half of the rating results (38–45%) are identical 
in the pairwise comparison or lie within a deviation of plus/minus one 
rating notch. Our results are therefore in line with earlier studies by 
Jacobson/Lindé/Roszbach (2006), who concluded – based on a Swedish 
data sample – that the quantification of credit risk does not only depend on 
the formal design of the rating model (e.g. number of rating classes), but 
is also influenced by a number of other parameters. An analysis by Carey, 
working with a similar approach to ours based on 20 US banks, showed 
that the models provide comparable results in 45% of the cases and in 95%, 
the deviations lie within a bandwidth of 2 rating notches (Carey (2002)). 
Our Hypothesis H1 states that different architectures lead to significantly 
different ratings and can therefore be confirmed. This result, can, however 
be influenced by a variety of factors. The models measure the same risk. 
However, they are different in terms of e.g. weighting of qualitative and 
quantitative criteria, weighting of the different factor groups (sum of the 
quantitative and qualitative factors), calibration with regard to historical 
loss data, default event definition and transformation of ratios into scores.
2)    The result discussed under 1 may lead to rating arbitrage. Borrowers, who 
are aware of the consequences of different rating model architectures may 
increasingly arbitrage rating models against each other. The establishment 
of independent SME rating agencies and the acceptance of external 
rating agencies by regulators will support this development. For the 
bank the problem of adverse selection effects arises. Ultimately, from 
a macroeconomic perspective, the question arises as to how and whether 
scarce capital resources can be attributed efficiently to risky projects. In 
a comparable analysis for rating models used by rating agencies when 
rating securitization transactions, it was established that the danger 
of arbitrage due to different rating model architectures is substantial
(Fender/Kiff (2005)).
3)   The inclusion of qualitative factors does not lead to a systematic rating 
improvement in the sense of a higher risk classification. This result of 
our empirical study contrasts existing literature. One possible reason for 119 Interpretation and Conclusion
this could be that the application of the base rating in Model 2 based on 
quantitative criteria is very strict (see details in section 4.2). The qualitative 
ratings may have a positive impact on the subsequent assessment, but their 
influence is not strong enough to over-compensate the strict base ratings 
in comparison with Model 3. Following the model design (Model 2), the 
maximum class reachable based on the quantitative assessment is 5 out of 
10; the qualitative factors can only improve the overall rating to a Class 
3 at the highest. Therefore, it is not possible to reach a better result than 
models basing their assessment on quantitative factors only, even though 
qualitative factors may contribute positively. When interpreting the results 
of our analysis, it should be considered that we looked at the rating models 
as a black box (except for the very basic elements of the architecture). 
Therefore, the direct correlation of the rating results with individual factor 
groups (quantitative/ qualitative) is difficult to extract and attribute to the 
model architecture. The description of the model architecture in section 2.1 
may lead to the assumption that the models vary substantially with regard 
to discriminatory power and sophistication. Independently of the inclusion 
and weight of qualitative factors, this may lead to a different distribution 
across rating classes. An additional explanation inherent in the model 
architecture could be a differentiation of factor weighting in dependence 
of the rating class (e.g. extreme capital ratios can lead to unproportional 
deterioration of risk assessment in Model 1). A third potential explanation 
could be a positive correlation of quantitative and qualitative factors 
in Model 1. i.e. low quantitative scores trigger negative assessment of 
qualitative factors and unproportionally increase the “downgrading”. That 
would result in a systematic bias of both good and bad risk assessments.
Our analysis shows that it is not only the choice of the rating model 
(quantitative versus qualitative models) but rather the detailed design of 
the model architecture that appears to be responsible for deviating risk 
classifications.120
6. Summary/Outlook
We used three different rating models by banks to rate a real credit portfolio 
from a commercial bank in Switzerland consisting of 435 representative 
Swiss SMEs from one region, well diversified across industries, age of the 
company and size. For each counterparty a real-life dataset of quantitative (as 
taken from balance sheet and income statements) and qualitative (non-public 
information as gathered by the respective credit officer) data from several 
consecutive years was available. Therefore, all counterparties could be rated 
with all three rating systems at a certain point in time between May 2005
and June 2006.
The various rating models result in 1-year PDs calibrated for the respective 
rating classes. We mapped the PDs on the official Moody’s rating scale, so 
that rating results of different models could be compared. To interpret the 
results, we worked with histograms, pairwise comparisons and cumulative 
distribution functions, as well as tested correlation and independency of 
distributions by respective statistical tests.
The models used measure the same risks. However, due to the different 
architectures, different calibration of the models and different weighting of 
qualitative data, the differences in ratings differ substantially. Hypothesis H1 
can therefore be confirmed.
The tested rating models differ in particular with regard to the weighting of 
the qualitative data and criteria. A pairwise comparison of the rating results 
of the models shows that the inclusion of qualitative factors does not lead to 
a systematically better rating result. Hypothesis H2 is therefore to be rejected. 
This result is in contrast to the findings of earlier studies.
The results of our analysis have interesting impacts, mainly in an environment 
where external ratings become more important under Basle II, both internal 
and external ratings become more transparent to better-informed borrowers 
and competition increases in the overall rating sector. If, as shown above, risk 
classifications of SME loans depend significantly on the architecture of the 
rating model, this could lead to rating model arbitrage against banks. If SMEs 
are aware of systematic pricing mismatches triggered by different rating 
models applied, rating shopping could be an issue. Furthermore, based on 121 Summary/Outlook
our empirical findings, the role of qualitative factors in the statistical ratings 
needs to be analyzed in more depth in future research.
Additionally, a thorough analysis of the factors which influence the fact that 
different model architectures lead to significantly different rating assessments 
would be an interesting research topic. Another field of interest would be 
the validation of rating models with different architectures in an analysis
across models.122
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